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schools educating 15-year-olds in eight countries. Overall, we show that higher management quality is 
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for by differences in leadership of the principal and better governance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are major disparities in the quality of education within and between countries (e.g. 
OECD 2012). School managerial practices may be an important reason for such differences. 
Unfortunately, understanding the role of management in schools within and across countries 
has been held back by a lack of robust and comparable instruments to systematically measure 
management practices and, thus, a lack of good data. 
The key purpose of this paper is to develop an international management index for schools 
and present descriptive evidence on management quality and education outcomes across 
schools of different types within and across countries. We used double-blind telephone 
interviews with school principals to collect information on management practices for over 
1,800 schools across eight countries. To construct our management index, we average across 
20 basic management practice measures in four areas of management: operations, 
monitoring, target setting and people. Each question is evaluated against a scoring grid that 
ranges from one (“worst practice”) to five (“best practice”). Our management index for each 
school represents the average of these scores. 
We also constructed measures of school-level pupil outcomes for these schools (when data 
was available) from examination results across regions and countries, creating a matched 
management-pupil outcome international dataset at the school level. 
This data allows us to document some stylized facts. First, we show that the adoption of basic 
managerial practices varies significantly across and within countries. The UK, Sweden, 
Canada and the US obtain the highest average scores, followed by Germany, Italy and Brazil, 
while India has the lowest scores.  About half of the variance in school management is at the 
country-level. This share is larger in education than we have found from our similar surveys 
in other sectors such as manufacturing, where most of the variation is within countries. This 
finding suggests that differences in the institutional environment have particularly important 
effects on the way schools are managed. 
Second, higher management scores are positively correlated with better pupil outcomes. 
More specifically, we find that one standard deviation increase in our managerial index is 
associated with a 0.232 to 0.425 standard deviation increase in pupil outcomes. Although the 
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cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to determine whether this correlation is 
causal (e.g. unobservable differences across schools might drive both pupil outcomes and 
management quality), the result does suggest that our management data has some useful 
informational content. 
 
Third, large disparities in management also exist within countries and regions, especially 
across types of schools. In particular, autonomous government schools - organisations that 
are publicly funded but are more decentralised from government control, like charter schools 
in the US and academies in the UK1- have significantly higher management scores than 
regular government schools and private schools. The difference in management of 
autonomous government schools does not reflect observable differences in pupil 
composition, school and regional characteristics, nor basic demographics or principal 
characteristics such as tenure and gender. It does, however, seem more closely linked to two 
features: (i) the strength of governance, i.e. having strong accountability for pupil 
performance to an outside body and (ii) the degree of school leadership, i.e. developing a 
long-term strategy for the school. Including these governance and leadership variables more 
than halves the managerial gap between autonomous government schools and other schools 
(although the gap remains significant). 
 
Previous efforts to survey school practices support our main findings. For example, Dobbie 
and Fryer (2013) and Angrist, Pathak, and Walters (2013) have collected extensive measures 
of school practices, focusing on a smaller sample of US schools. Dobbie and Fryer (2013) 
report in a sample of 39 New York charter schools that management practices similar to those 
we measure – in particular teacher feedback, data guided instruction and high expectations -  
are associated with substantially higher grades. Angrist, Pathak, and Walters (2013) survey a 
sample of 36 Massachusetts charter schools and link the impact of urban charter schools2 to 
practices such as instructional time, classroom technique and school philosophy - labelled the 
“No Excuses” approach. Intriguingly both papers also find little or no impact of schools 
																																																								
1 We define autonomous government schools as schools receiving at least partial funding from the government 
and with at least limited autonomy to follow school-specific charters in one of three areas: establishing the 
curriculum content, selecting teachers, and admitting pupils. In our data, these are escolas de referência in 
Brazil, separate schools in Canada, private ersatzschulen in Germany, private-aided schools in India, friskolor in 
Sweden, academies, foundation, and voluntary-aided schools in the UK (equivalent to autonomous state 
schools), and charter and magnet schools in the US. See Table 1 for more details. 
2 The authors find more mixed results for the non-urban charter schools. 
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inputs – class size, per-pupil expenditure or teacher training – on pupil performance, a result 
shared with Hannushek and Woessmann (2010) on a cross country basis.  
 
In our data collection efforts, we focus on a set of basic management practices, which we 
have shown to matter across other sectors (see the survey of this work in Bloom, Lemos, 
Sadun, Scur, Van Reenen 2014). The school data is less rich and does not have the 
compelling experimental design of the New York and Massachusetts data, however we have 
a much larger sample of schools and an international dimension. Our results extend the 
current literature by highlighting the variance of management quality in schools within and 
across countries, the relatively low management quality on an absolute level compared to 
other sectors, and its widespread link to pupil outcomes and autonomy levels across 
countries, 
 
This paper also contributes to several literatures. Firstly, we link to work on the role of 
institutions for school performance, focusing in particular on their implications for 
management practices. Many recent contributions (e.g. from the OECD’s PISA studies) have 
also looked at this through the lens of autonomy, centralized monitoring, school choice, 
teacher incentives and instructional time.3 Secondly, there is a burgeoning number of studies 
on alternative types of school governance and management on pupil outcomes. These studies 
have focused on autonomous government schools, such as US urban charter schools. 4 
Thirdly, through the analysis of principal-specific characteristics we relate to the agenda 
investigating the effect of school leadership.5 Finally and more generally, we contribute to the 
emerging literature investigating management practices in public sector institutions.6 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the data and 
methodology we used to measure management practices across schools. Section III provides 
																																																								
3 For examples see Hanushek and Woessmann (2010), Fuchs and Woessmann (2007), Woessmann et al. (2007), 
Woessmann (2005), Woessmann (2010), Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann (2013), and Lavy (2010). 
4 For examples of studies looking at US urban charter schools see Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), Angrist, Pathak, 
and Walters (2013), Angrist et al. (2011), Fryer (2014), Dobbie and Fryer (2011, 2013), Curto and Fryer (2014), 
and Hoxby and Murarka (2009). Other studies looking at US rural charter schools include Angrist et al. (2011), 
UK academies include Eyles and Machin (2014), Machin and Vernoit (2011), and Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff 
(2009), Swedish friskolor include Sahlgren (2011) and Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012) and Canadian separate 
schools include Card, Dooley, Payne (2010). 
5 For examples see Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2012), Dhuey and Smith (2011), Coelli and Green (2012), 
Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff (2009), Béteille, Kalogrides, and Loeb (2012), Grissom and Loeb (2011), and 
Horng, Klasik, and Loeb (2010). 
6  For examples see Bloom, Propper, Seiler and Van Reenen (2015), McCormack, Propper, and Smith (2013), 
Rasul and Rogger (2013). 
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a basic description of the differences in school management across and within countries. 
Section IV investigates the relationship between school management practices and pupil 
outcomes. Section V explores the factors linked to the variation of management practices 
across countries, examining the role of school ownership and governance within countries. 
Section VI concludes. 
 
II. DATA  
 
Measuring management practices in education 
To measure management practices in schools, we adapted a survey methodology described in 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), previously employed in the manufacturing, retail and 
healthcare sectors. The survey investigates the adoption of 20 basic management practices, 
where the level of adoption is evaluated against a grid from one to five.7 A high score 
indicates that a school adopts structured practices. Our main measure of management 
practices represents the average of the scores across all 20 questions. To ensure comparability 
across sectors, we retained most of the questions included in our previous studies of 
organizations in other sectors, with modifications to reflect the school context (the full list of 
questions can be found in Table A1).8 We interviewed the principal/head teacher in each 
school.  
 
We measure four broad areas of management: 
 
1. Operations 
Standardization of Instructional Planning Processes: school uses meaningful processes 
that allow pupils to learn over time 
Personalization of Instruction and Learning: school incorporates teaching methods that 
ensure all pupils can master the learning objectives 
Data-Driven Planning and Pupil Transitions: school uses assessment and easily 
available data to verify learning outcomes at critical stages 
																																																								
7 In the earlier manufacturing-focused survey wave we carried out an extensive evaluation of this approach, 
including comparing telephone interviews with face-to-face visits, running management experiments on firms, 
and resurveying 5% of the sample with different interviewers and managers at the same firm. In all cases we 
found strong evidence that our telephone surveys were providing a good proxy of firm management practices – 
see Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) for details. 
8 Sixteen of these twenty basic practices are considered to be relevant and applicable across all industries 
previously surveyed (for example, performance based promotion) while the remaining four are specific to the 
management of schools (for example, lesson planning). 
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Adopting Educational Best Practices: school incorporates and shares teaching best 
practices and pupil strategies across classrooms accordingly. 
 
2. Monitoring 
Continuous Improvement: school implements processes towards continuous 
improvement and encourages lessons to be captured and documented 
Performance Tracking: school performance is regularly tracked with useful metrics 
Performance Review: school performance is reviewed with appropriate metrics 
Performance Dialogue: school performance is discussed with appropriate content, 
depth and communicated to teachers. 
Consequence Management: mechanisms exit to follow-up on performance issues  
 
3. Target Setting 
Target Balance: school covers a sufficiently broad set of targets at the school, 
department, and individual levels 
Target Interconnection: school establishes well-aligned targets across all levels 
Time Horizon of Targets: there is a rational approach to planning and setting targets 
Target Stretch: school sets targets with the appropriate level of difficulty 
Clarity and Comparability of Targets: school sets understandable targets and openly 
communicates and compares school, department and individual performance 
 
4. People Management9 
Rewarding High Performers: school implements a systematic approach to identifying 
good and bad performance, rewarding teachers proportionately. 
Fixing Poor Performers: school deals with underperformers promptly 
Promoting High Performers: school promotes employees based on job performance 
Managing Talent: school nurtures and develops teaching and leadership talent 
Retaining Talent: school attempts to retain employees with high performance 
Creating a Distinctive Employee Value Proposition: school has a thought-through 
approach to attract employees  
 
																																																								
9 These practices are similar to those emphasized in earlier work on management practices, by for example 
Black and Lynch (2001), and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997). 
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Obtaining school surveys across countries 
We randomly sampled schools that offered education to 15-year-olds and had at least 50 
pupils. These schools are large enough that the type of systematic management practices we 
study here are likely to matter.10 We used a variety of procedures to remove potential sources 
of bias from our estimates. First, we monitored interviewers’ performance in contacting 
schools and scheduling interviews. The interviewers ran on average two interviews a day 
lasting approximately an hour each and spent the remainder of their time repeatedly 
contacting principals to schedule interviews. Second, we presented the study as a confidential 
conversation about management experiences, starting with non-controversial questions such 
as “What is your school’s plan for the next five years?” and “What tools and resources are 
provided to teachers?” Third, we never asked principals about the school’s overall pupil 
performance during the interview. Instead, we obtained such data from other sources, which 
were usually from administrative information (described in Appendix A). Fourth, we sent 
informational letters and copies of endorsements letters from respected institutions, such as 
the UK Department for Education, Harvard University’s Program on Education Policy and 
Governance, and Brazil’s Itaú Social Foundation.11  
 
In terms of interviews completed, we obtained an overall high response rate (41% on 
average12), ranging from 58%, 57% and 42% of eligible schools in Brazil, Italy and India, 
respectively, to 36%, 26%, 20% and 19% of eligible school in Sweden, Germany, the US and 
Canada. We obtained a substantially lower response rate in the UK – 8% of eligible schools – 
most likely due to the proliferation of cold-calling and the increasing number of telephone 
surveys in schools in the UK, and principals’ slow turnaround time for a response after the 
initial contact by interviewers (which was common throughout the North American and 
European countries surveyed).  
 
The response rate of 41% is similar to our previous manufacturing and healthcare surveys. It 
is also roughly comparable to other management surveys in education such as 64% response 
rate of middle and high schools in Massachusetts, US (Angrist, Pathak, and Walters, 2013), 
																																																								
10 In Brazil, Canada, Italy, Germany, US, and UK, these schools are part of the upper secondary or high school 
education system. In India these schools are part of the lower secondary education system while in Sweden they 
are still considered primary schools. 
11 Despite the common practice of paying organizations to participate in research, we did not provide managers 
with financial incentives to participate.  
12 Average weighted by the number of interviews in each country. 
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57% response rate of UK University departments (McCormack, Propper and Smith, 2014), 
and 39% response rate of New York Charter schools (Dobbie and Fryer, 2013).13  
 
However, when interviewers were able to connect with school principals, they typically 
agreed to the survey proposition when interviewers were able to connect with them. As such, 
the explicit refusal rate among eligible schools was generally low across all countries 
surveyed, ranging from 2% in Sweden, 6% in both the US and Canada, 9% in India, 13% in 
both Brazil and the UK, 15% in Italy and to 16% of all eligible schools in Germany. In terms 
of selection bias, we compare our sample of schools for which we secured an interview with 
the sample of eligible schools in each country against size, ownership, and location. We 
obtain few significant coefficients with marginal effects small in magnitude. We further 
construct sampling weights and observe that our main unweighted results stand even when 
using alternative sample weighting schemes. We describe our selection analysis as well as the 
sampling frame sources and response rates in more detail in Appendix C. 
 
Maximizing response rates and interview quality 
We also followed several steps to obtain a high quality response. First, we use a “double-
blind” interview technique. That is, at one end, we conducted the telephone survey without 
informing the principals that their answers would be evaluated against a scoring grid. Thus, 
we gathered information about actual management practices as opposed to the principal’s 
aspirations of what should (rather than does) happen. At the other end, our interviewers did 
not know in advance anything about the school’s performance. Interviewers were only 
provided with the school’s name and telephone number and had generally not heard of the 
schools on their lists before, thus, having no preconceptions about them.  
 
Second, we used open-ended questions – that is, questions which avoid leading responders 
towards a particular answer. For example, on the first performance monitoring dimension we 
start by asking the open question “What kind of main indicators do you use to track school 
performance?”, rather than a closed-ended question like “Do you use class-room level test 
scores indicators [yes/no]?”. The first open-ended question is followed by further questions 
																																																								
13 Other establishment survey response rate benchmarks include at the high-end the US Census response rates to 
the mandatory Management and Organizational Practices Survey at 80% (Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, 
Saporta and Van Reenen, 2013), in the mid-range the 30% response rate of small firms by Aurora, Cohen and 
Walsh (2014), down to the 7% response rate for Chief Financial Officers at medium and large firms (Ben-
David, Graham and Harvey, 2013). 
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like “How frequently are these indicators measured?”, “Who gets to see this data?” and then 
“If I were to walk through your school what could I tell about how you are doing against your 
indicators?” The combined responses to this dimension are scored against a grid which goes 
from 1 - defined as “Measures tracked do not indicate directly if overall objectives are being 
met. Tracking is an ad-hoc process (certain processes aren’t tracked at all).” up to 5 - 
defined as “Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and 
informally, to all staff using a range of visual management tools.” During their training 
session, the interviewers are also encouraged to ask follow-up questions whenever necessary. 
 
Third, we had rigorous interviewer training. We required all interviewers to undergo one 
week of initial training, including multiple group scoring sessions to ensure consistency 
across countries.14 We also required them to conduct and listen to at least 25 interviews to 
correct any inconsistent interpretation of responses. Fourth, we “double-scored” the majority 
of interviews (69%). That is, we asked the team managers, whose main role was monitoring, 
to silently listen and score the responses provided during each interview. After the end of the 
interview, the team manager discussed these scores with the primary interviewer, providing 
on-going training and calibration. 
 
Finally, we also collected “noise-controls”, that is, data on the interview process itself (such 
as the time of day and the day of the week), characteristics of the interviewee and the identity 
of the interviewer. We include these noise controls in the regression analysis to improve the 
precision of our estimates by reducing some of the measurement error. 
 
Choosing countries to survey 
The choice of countries was driven by funding availability, the availability of school 
sampling frames, and research and policy interest. We are continuing to roll these school 
management surveys out across countries, for example hoping to extend this shortly to China, 
Denmark and Mexico through collaborations with other research institutions.  
																																																								
14 During these calibration exercises, the whole team listened to both created role-play interviews and actual live 
interviews (in English) then subsequently compared scores. Any differences in scoring were discussed to ensure 
a common interpretation of the scoring grid. These calibration sessions were run intensively at the beginning 
and then periodically through-out the project (to avoid any interviewers scoring drifting over time). 
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Classifying differences across school types 
In order to look at management practices across different types of schools, we classify regular 
government schools, autonomous government schools and private schools based on two main 
characteristics: their source of funding and their degree of autonomy in establishing the 
curriculum content, selecting teachers, and admitting pupils. Regular government schools 
receive full funding from the government (national or local level) and follow government-
wide rules and regulations with little or no autonomy in these three areas. Private schools 
receive solely private funding (they may be for-profit or not-for-profit) and follow school-
specific charters, having full autonomy over all three areas mentioned above. Autonomous 
government schools receive most of their funding from the government but have more 
autonomy to follow school-specific charters on curriculum, teacher selection and (sometimes) 
limited pupil selection.15 
 
Table 1 classifies school types across these areas. By this criteria we defined the following 
types of schools as autonomous government schools: Escolas de Referência (Brazil); 
Separate Schools (Canada); Private Ersatzschulen (Germany), Private-Aided Schools (India); 
Friskolor (Sweden); Academy, Foundation and Voluntary-Aided Schools (UK); and Charter 
and Magnet Schools (US). There are no autonomous government schools in Italy.  
 
Appendix Table B1 presents means and standard deviations of our variables for the overall 
sample and Table B2 breaks them down by country and shows differences across private, 
autonomous government and regular government schools in deviations from country means. 
In the OECD countries and Brazil autonomous government schools have higher management 
scores than both regular government schools and private schools. India looks different with 
private schools scoring most highly. However, Table B2 also shows that autonomous 
government schools are systematically different on many dimensions. For example, they are 
smaller than regular government schools and more likely to be in urban areas. Our analysis 
will consider whether the apparently higher management scores (and pupil performance) of 
such schools is due to such confounding influences. 
 
																																																								
15 Pupil selection in autonomous government schools is usually not based on academic ability (although we will 
analyse this) but rather on other dimensions. For example, UK academies can select up to 10% of pupils on 
“aptitude” (such as sporting or musical ability). 
11 
 
Collecting measures of pupil performance 
Given the absence of publicly comparable metrics of school-level performance across 
countries, 16  we collected several country-specific measures of educational achievement 
ranging from standardized (and sometimes compulsory) examination results to non-
standardized examination results. 
 
We use the following main measures in each country: (1) In the US we construct measures of 
school performance using the math, science and reading exam pass rate from High School 
Exit Exams (HSEEs) and End-of-Course (EOCs) exams in states where performance 
measures were available. (2) In the UK we employ the average uncapped GCSE score, the 
contextual value added measure, and the proportion of pupils achieving five GCSEs (level 2) 
including English and Maths. (3) In Canada we employ the school-level rating produced by 
the Fraser Institute, which is based on several measures of pupil achievement, including 
average province exam mark, percentage of exams failed, courses taken per pupil, diploma 
completion rate, and delayed advancement rate. (4) In Sweden we use the GPA in the 9th 
grade and the percentage of pupils qualifying for upper secondary school. (5) In Brazil we 
use the average scores for math, natural sciences, and language and codes of the non-
mandatory High School National Exam (Exame Nacional do Ensino Medio, ENEM). We also 
use 9th grade average score of Prova Brasil for government schools. (6) In India we use the 
average scores for math, science and first language in the X Standards examinations. The 
details of these measures and their sources for each country and are provided in Appendix A.  
 
III. SCHOOL MANAGEMENT ACROSS AND WITHIN COUNTRIES 
Figure 1 shows the average management scores across countries. The adoption of modern 
managerial processes in schools is fairly limited: on an index of 1 to 5, the average 
management score across all countries is 2.27, which corresponds to a low level of adoption 
of many of the managerial practices included in the questionnaire. There are, however, 
significant differences across countries. The UK has the highest management score (2.9), 
closely followed by Sweden, Canada and the US (all on 2.8). Germany is slightly lower (2.5) 
and Italy is substantially lower (2.1). The emerging economies of Brazil (2.0) and India (1.7) 
have the lowest scores. The rankings do not change substantially when we include school and 
																																																								
16 The main exception to this, which is relevant to our study of schools offering education to 15-year olds, is the 
pupil level data on achievement collected in the framework of the PISA project. Unfortunately due to 
confidentiality constraints the PISA data cannot be released with school identifiers. We were therefore unable to 
match the two datasets. 
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principal controls suggesting that these differences in management are not driven by school, 
principal or interviewee characteristics.17 
 
Differences in management across countries are larger in education than in other sectors. 
Country fixed effects account for 46% of the variance in the school management scores 
compared to 13% in manufacturing and 40% in hospitals across the same subset of countries 
and questions. This finding suggests that institutions play an important role in management 
practices in the education sector (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007). 
 
Figure 2 shows the differences across countries, splitting the management index into people 
management practices (hiring, firing, pay and promotions) and other non-people management 
practices (operations, monitoring and target setting). Interestingly, there are some clear 
variations in relative strengths and weaknesses. Across all countries, schools are notably 
weaker in people management practices. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the management scores within each country with the 
smoothed (kernel) fit of the US for comparison. Across OECD countries, lower average 
country-level management scores are associated with an increasing dispersion towards the 
left tail of the distribution: every country except the UK has some schools scoring below two. 
A score of below two indicates very poor management practices - almost no monitoring, very 
weak targets (e.g. only an annual school-level target) and extremely weak incentives (e.g. 
tenure based promotion, no financial or non-financial incentives and no action taken about 
underperforming teachers). However, while the fraction of schools scoring between one and 
two is minimal in countries such as Sweden and Canada (2.2% and 2.7%, respectively), it 
rises to 82% in India.  
 
At the other end of the distribution, we also observe that all OECD countries have some 
schools scoring on average above three, which in contrast would correspond to medium to 
widespread adoption of the management practices (some reasonable performance monitoring, 
a mix of targets and performance based promotion, rewards and steps taken to address 
persistent underperformance). The fraction of schools scoring above three ranges from 46% 
in the UK to 5% in Italy. While the distribution of management scores for Brazil is very 
																																																								
17 We look in more detail at sample selection in Appendix C, Table C4. 
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similar to the Italian distribution (a wide dispersion of scores and a “fat” left tail of weakly 
managed schools), India is clearly different from the OECD countries. In India the 
distribution of the management scores shifts completely to the left: the vast majority of 
schools scores below two, and no school scores above three, indicating that Indian schools 
seem to have very weak management practices, with very little monitoring, target setting and 
use of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Looking at a comparable set of practices 
across other sectors, we find that the fraction of Indian firms scoring above three is 22% for 
manufacturing and 10% for hospitals, compared to only 1.6% for schools. This finding 
matches up to the long literature on poor management practices in Indian schools.18  
 
Figure 4 plots the distribution of management scores for three sectors for the US and the UK. 
It is striking that for the US the mean of the distribution is lowest for schools, in the middle 
for hospitals and highest for manufacturing firms in the US.19 For the UK schools are in the 
middle of the three industries – above hospitals and below manufacturing. We can also 
compare our scores to those for University departments collected by McCormack, Propper 
and Smith (2014) in the UK. This reports a similarly wide dispersion of management 
practices in UK universities, with a moderately higher mean. There is also a significant 
positive relationship between university management practices on the one hand and 
academics’ performance in research and teaching on the other. In the next sub-section we will 
show that the positive association between management and student performance also exists 
for our sample of schools.  
 
IV. MANAGEMENT QUALITY AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 
Are our management scores related to meaningful educational outcomes? While we are by no 
means able to establish whether management is causally related to improvements in 
educational achievements, we see this analysis as a useful external validation exercise of our 
management data.20 If the management data were just noise, there should be no systematic 
relationship between management and objective information on pupil performance. 
																																																								
18 See, for example, Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2012) and the literature discussion therein.  
19 In contrast to the average school score of 2.27 across all eight countries, the average manufacturing firm 
scores 3.01 for the same eight countries (firms employing 50 to 5000 workers). The average school also scores 
lower but more similarly to the average hospital (general hospitals offering acute care plus cardiology or 
orthopedics procedures), where the average score is 2.43 across these eight countries. 
20 The association between management and firm performance has already been empirically tested in other 
sectors outside education, including manufacturing, hospitals and retail (e.g. Bloom et al., 2012). Better 
management practices have also been associated with better outcomes for workers, with for example, Bloom et 
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Empirical model of pupil performance 
We consider a base simple “educational production function”,21 where school-level average 
pupil exam outcomes ( ௜ܻ௖) are related to pupil composition, management and other school-
level characteristics, where i denotes individual schools and c denotes country. We are 
particularly interested in the coefficient on the management index (M is the average of the z-
scores of each of the 20 individual z-scores of the management questions). 
 
௜ܻ௖ ൌ 		 ߚெܯ௜௖ ൅ ߚ஺௎்ீை௏ܣܷܶܩܱ ௜ܸ௖ ൅ ߚ௉ோூܴܲܫܸܣܶܧ௜௖ ൅	γ௑ ௜ܺ௖ 	൅	ݑ௜௖             (1) 
 
We focus on the three types of school discussed above: autonomous government schools 
(AUTGOV), private schools (PRIVATE), and regular government schools as the omitted base. 
X are the other controls detailed below and ݑ௜௖ is an error term. To control for some of the 
other dimensions that may differ across type of school we include the type of curriculum (the 
regular academic school programs vs. vocational/technical education) and whether the school 
can select pupils based on academic merit. 
 
Our empirical proxies for educational outcomes are school-level measures of pupil 
achievement as described the subsection II above and Appendix A. In summary, we use 
country-specific measures of educational achievement as follows: the percentage of pupils 
who passed their secondary school core subject exit exams (US), the percentage of pupils 
who qualified for upper secondary school (Sweden), the average overall score and subject-
specific scores for secondary school exit examinations (India, Sweden, and UK), rankings 
and contextual value added based on several indicators including pupil grades and 
characteristics (Canada and UK), and mandatory and non-mandatory university entrance 
qualification national exams (Brazil). Given the differences in school-level indicators of 
pupils’ achievement across countries, we standardize outcome measures within each country 
and include country dummies in all specifications when we pool across countries. 
 
We control for school resources and inputs by including measures of the number of pupils in 
the school, the pupil/teacher ratio, and a dummy to capture schools that select pupils partially 
																																																																																																																																																																												
al. (2011) reporting well-managed firms have better facilities for workers such as child-care facilities, job 
flexibility and self-assessed employee satisfaction. 
21 See Hanushek (1979) for a conceptual and empirical discussion of education production functions. 
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based on academic merits. More detailed controls for pupil characteristics depend on the data 
available for each country. These include the proportion of pupils who are female, non-white, 
who do not speak the national language as their primary language, and who are eligible for 
free school meals (a standard poverty measure). We consider specifications that estimate 
equation (1) by pooling across all countries and using only basic controls for pupil 
composition, but we also show specifications where we estimate the equation separately for 
each country where we can control for pupil composition in finer detail (at the cost of smaller 
sample sizes). Finally, some specifications control for survey measurement error by including 
interviewer dummies, a subjective interview reliability indicator coded by the interviewer, the 
day of the week, time in which the interview took place and interview duration. 
 
We have a sample of just over 1,000 schools when we estimate equation (1). This smaller 
sample size is mainly because we do not have access to school level performance data in Italy 
and Germany.22 However, we do find a positive relationship between the average PISA pupil 
performance score and the average management score in German regions (correlation of 0.65, 
significant at the 10% level) and Italian regions (correlation of 0.63, significant at the 5% 
level).23  
 
Main results on pupil performance 
Table 2 presents the results of regressing school-level measures of pupil achievement on the 
management score. Looking at the table as a whole, management quality is positively 
correlated with pupil achievement across all countries. Column (1) reports the cross-country 
pooled regression with controls only for country dummies. The coefficient implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in the management score index (0.65 points in the raw 
management score) is associated with an increase of 0.425 of a standard deviation in pupil 
achievement. Column (2) includes the dummy variables for school type. Private schools and 
																																																								
22 There are also a portion of schools in the other six countries where we could not obtain performance data. For 
example, in the US we did not find public information on pupil performance in private schools, we did not 
collect performance data in states where we interviewed only one school or states which do not have a High 
School Exit Exam or End-of-Course Assessments. In India we collected performance measures over the 
telephone by calling back the school and speaking to the exams coordinators (response of 50%) and were also 
not able to collect information with a number of private schools no longer requiring their students to take the X 
Standard Examinations. In Canada, the Fraser Institute 2009 school ratings were only collected in Alberta, 
British Columbia, and Ontario. Thus, in the US, India and Canada, we were not able to collect performance data 
for approximately 47-53% of the sample. In Brazil, Sweden and the UK, we did not find public information for 
a very small portion of the schools surveyed (approximately 7-8% in each). 
23 We use 2006 PISA regional average scores for 8 German regions and 2009 PISA regional average scores for 
14 Italian regions, restricting to regions with 5 or more observations. 
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autonomous government schools obtain significantly higher pupil outcomes than regular 
government schools. If we drop the management variable, the coefficient on these school 
types rises substantially.24 We will return to the difference between school types in the next 
table. 
 
Column (3) includes the set of more general controls which slightly decreases the coefficient 
on management to 0.232, and it remains significant at the 1% level.25 The magnitude remains 
sizeable. For example, a one standard deviation improvement in management is equivalent to 
49% of the improvement associated with the selection of pupils based on academic merit. In 
terms of the other characteristics larger schools have higher performance as do those with a 
higher teacher-pupil ratio (although not significantly so).  
 
In columns (4) to (9) we disaggregate by country and add a richer set of country-specific 
controls. Across all countries, management quality continues to be positively associated with 
better pupil outcomes and in most countries this relationship is significant at the 10% level or 
greater.26 The correlation is largest in Canada (0.609) and smallest in Brazil (0.104).27 It is 
difficult to interpret the reasons for the cross-country differences given the different measures 
of test scores. Some of the differences in significance are related to sample size: the only two 
countries with a statistically insignificant coefficient on management are the two with the 
smallest number of schools (Canada has a sample size of 77 and Sweden has 82). We do not 
find a systematically larger coefficient in the “Anglo-Saxon” countries (e.g. the US 
coefficient on management is smaller than the one in India), which is consistent with the view 
that the management measure are not inherently culturally biased. 
 
																																																								
24 For example the coefficient on autonomous government schools rises from 0.23 to 0.30. 
25 To put this result into perspective in view of the larger literature using educational production functions, 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001) find that a one standard deviation reduction in class size (roughly 3 pupils 
per class) is associated with a 0.02 of a standard deviation increase in achievement. Hanushek and Rivkin (2003) 
find that a one standard deviation increase in the degree of competition (0.02 point decline in the Herfindahl 
Index) is associated with a reduction of 0.09 standard-deviations in the within school variance of teacher quality. 
In other words, performance associations for management quality are between 2 to 3 times as large as for 
competition and teacher quality and over ten times as large as for a measured input such as class size. 
26 	In a companion paper, Di Liberto, Schivardi and Sulis (2013) find a positive and weakly significant 
association between nationally-tested student level math exams outcomes in Italy and our management 
measures.	
27  In Table B3 we report the results of the association between pupil outcomes and management using 
alternative measures of pupil outcomes. The majority of the results are consistent with Table 2, i.e. management 
is positively and significantly associated with most available school-level measures of pupil outcomes. 
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A criticism of the results in Table 2 is that we are not fully controlling for the fact that pupil 
intake is very different across schools, so it may be that the better managed schools are 
simply lucky enough to have better quality students sorting into these schools. For one 
country (the UK) there are published school-level measures of value added, which tracks the 
average improvement in pupils’ grades between entering and exiting the school. Such value 
added measures are superior to just using test score measures as their control for initial intake 
quality. Column (10) uses value added as an outcome and shows that our management score 
actually displays a statistically and economically stronger correlation with this value added 
measure than the raw test score measure in the previous column (0.881 vs. 0.512). Hence, 
although we do not have value added measures for all countries, it seems unlikely that 
differential student intake is driving the results in Table 2. 
 
Robustness of pupil performance results 
Appendix Table B4 presents some robustness tests of the results of regressing school-level 
measures of pupil achievement on the management using column (3) of Table 2 as a baseline. 
The management survey includes several questions related to people management (e.g. use of 
incentives, practices related to promotion and dismissals of teachers) that are heavily 
regulated across most of the countries in our sample. One possible concern is that regulatory 
constraints might reduce the observed variation along these areas of management, thus 
inhibiting our ability to estimate their association with school-level pupil outcomes. We look 
at this issue in two ways. First, the distribution of people management by country shows 
substantial within country variation (Appendix Figure B1). This finding suggests that national 
regulations are not homogenous or completely binding on schools. Second, people 
management alone is positively and significantly correlated with school-level outcomes, with 
a coefficient (standard error) of 0.257(0.046) in an equivalent specification to column (5) of 
Table B4. The other non-people related areas of management are also significantly correlated 
with outcomes – coefficients (standard error) of 0.093(0.036) for operations, 0.133(0.036) for 
performance monitoring, and 0.158(0.038) for target setting. The sub-set of 16 questions 
asked in an almost identical fashion to other sectors like manufacturing and healthcare (e.g. 
performance tracking, goal setting etc.) has a coefficient (standard error) of 0.248(0.045). We 
also looked at a subset of questions that are related to five practices examined in Dobbie and 
Fryer (2013) in New York charter schools - frequent teacher feedback, the use of data to 
guide instruction, high dosage tutoring, increased instructional time, and a culture of high 
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expectations.28 We constructed a similar “Dobbie and Fryer” management index from our 
questions (data-driven planning and pupil transitions, adopting education best practices, 
personalization of instruction and learning, and clearly defined accountability for principals). 
This coefficient (standard error) on this index is 0.134(0.038). 
 
V. HOW MANAGEMENT VARIES ACROSS SCHOOLS: THE ROLE OF 
AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 
 
Empirical model of management 
Having established the presence of a positive correlation between our management practices 
score and school-level educational outcomes, we now turn to study how management varies 
within countries. We distinguish between three main types of schools: private schools, 
autonomous government schools and regular government schools. Recall that we define 
autonomous government schools as schools receiving at least partial funding from the 
government and with at least limited autonomy in one of three areas: establishing the 
curriculum content, selecting teachers, and admitting pupils.29 We use a simple regression 
model of the form: 
 
ܯ௜௖ ൌ 		 ߙ஺௎்ைீை௏ܣܷܶܩܱ ௜ܸ௖ ൅ ߙ௉ோூ௏஺்ாܴܲܫܸܣܶܧ௜௖ ൅	ߙ௓ ௜ܺ௖ 	൅	ݒ௜௖             (2) 
 
Given the differences between OECD and non-OECD countries we estimate separate 
equations for Brazil and India. Although we pool across OECD countries in the main 
specifications, we also consider disaggregating the OECD regressions by country (Appendix 
Table B5). Figure 5 shows management index differences across autonomous government, 
regular government and private schools in deviations from country means. On average across 
countries, private schools have the highest scores, followed by autonomous government 
schools and regular government schools at the bottom. There is much heterogeneity in the 
ranking across countries, however. 
 
																																																								
28 	Dobbie and Fryer (2013) show that this set of five practices are also strongly correlated with pupil 
achievement and explain approximately 45% of the variation in school effectiveness.	 In an experimental setting,  
Fryer (2014) shows that the average impact of implementing these policies significantly increases pupil math 
achievement in treated elementary and secondary schools by 0.15 to 0.18 standard deviations.	
29 Table 1 provides more details about schools under this classification across countries. 
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Main results on management 
Across OECD countries column (1) of Table 3 shows that autonomous government schools 
obtain significantly higher management scores than regular government schools (the omitted 
base category). The difference is large and significant: the management score of autonomous 
schools is 0.233 of a standard deviation higher relative to regular government schools, which 
amounts to about 13% of the gap in management between (say) the UK and India. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on private schools is negative suggesting that their higher pupil 
outcomes in earlier tables may be due to the type of pupils attending them. The base of the 
table has a test of the difference between autonomous government schools and private 
schools and finds this is significant across all specifications. 
 
Clearly, differences in management may simply capture differences in observable 
characteristics across school types (Table B2 showed that school types differ across other 
dimensions beyond management). So in column (2) we augment the specification with the 
other covariates used in Table 2 together with “survey noise” controls, such as interviewer 
dummies. The coefficient on autonomous government schools slightly increases, suggesting 
that the managerial advantage of these schools is not mainly due to these factors.  Similar to 
other sectors, size is significantly positively correlated with management scores. This might 
reflect the existence of economies of scale in management. It might also reflect the ability of 
better managed schools to attract more pupils, although this is less likely given that schools 
tend to have difficulty growing in most systems. 30  Management is also significantly 
negatively correlated with the pupil/teacher ratio which may capture the fact that schools with 
higher resources may be able to establish and enforce better management processes (for 
example, when teachers are not as overstretched it might be easier to use merit based 
promotions, deal with underperformance etc.31). 
 
Another possible explanation for the higher management score of autonomous government 
schools could be differences in location. For example, Angrist, Pathak, and Walters (2013) 
point out that while charter schools in urban areas have positive effects on pupil achievement, 
non-urban charter schools are on average ineffective and in some instances even detrimental 
																																																								
30  Since private (and to a lesser extent autonomous government) schools have more ability to grow, we 
examined the reallocation story by looking at whether the association between management and size was 
stronger for these schools. We did not find systematic evidence of this, suggesting that the correlation may be 
more due to scale economies. 
31 Indeed, the negative correlation between management and the pupil/teacher ratio is much larger for the people 
management portion of the survey relative to the other non-people management questions.  
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to pupils. To account for locational differences, we measure of population density in the area 
where the school is located in column (3).32 We do find that schools in urban areas tend to 
have significantly higher managerial scores, but this only reduces the coefficient on 
autonomous government schools slightly (from 0.273 to 0.244).33 
 
Appendix Table B5 explores the heterogeneity of the results across countries by estimating 
the same regression in column (3) of Table 3 separately for each of the OECD country in our 
sample. The coefficient on autonomous government schools is positive across all the 
countries in our sample, although it is especially large for Sweden which had the most radical 
institutional change towards autonomous government schools among our sampled 
countries.34  
 
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 we repeat the specifications for Brazil. We also find a 
positive managerial differential between autonomous government schools and regular 
government schools, although this result is based on only three autonomous government 
schools, thus difficult to generalize.35 In contrast with OECD countries, however, private 
schools in Brazil appear to have much higher scores relative to regular government schools. 
The private-regular government schools gap is substantial (about half a standard deviation), 
and is robust to the inclusion of measures of school size, curriculum offered and the ability to 
select pupils based on merit. Also in contrast with the OECD countries, the ability to select 
pupils on the basis of academic merit is positively correlated with management, while the 
proxy for regional density is not. 
																																																								
32 Our measure of population density is at the NUTS 3 level for the OECD, at the municipality level for Brazil 
and at the sub-district level (Tehsils or Mandals) for India.  
33 The density variable is insignificant when included in the pupil performance regressions of column (3) of 
Table 2. 
34 The coefficient on the autonomous government schools dummy is very strong and significant in Sweden, and 
positive but not significant in Canada, Germany, UK, US. The coefficient on the dummy is still positive and 
significant at the 10% level when we pool all countries except Sweden. The Swedish case presents unique 
features as its education system benefited from a series of aggressive and rapid reforms in the early 1990s, 
starting with a decentralization of education to the municipal level, holding municipalities financially 
accountable for its schools and implementing a voucher program which led to a sharp increase in the number of 
friskolor and the number of pupils attending those schools (Sahlgren 2011). The US charter schools and the UK 
academies, on the other hand, were being progressively introduced at a much slower pace, starting in the mid- to 
the end of the 1990s. Studying the impact of the introduction of academies on pupil achievement, Machin and 
Vernoit (2011) find stronger positive results for schools that have been academies for longer and who have 
experienced the largest changes in governance practices, suggesting that the benefits of introducing autonomous 
government schools in an education system may take a while to materialize. 
35 In 2007, the state of Pernambuco partnered with a group of companies committed to improving education to 
convert 10 existing secondary schools into a new model of reference schools. By 2010, the program had 
expanded to 60 full-day and 100 half-day secondary schools (Bruns, Evans and Luque, 2012). By 2013, it 
reached a total of 260 schools. 
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The final three columns of Table 3 repeat the specifications for India. The results 
substantially differ from the rest of the Table.  Column (7) shows that private schools score 
on average higher in terms of management relative to regular government schools, while no 
significant difference can be found for autonomous government schools. However, the 
private-regular government differential is insignificant when we introduce basic controls for 
school size, pupil/teacher ratios and the ability to select pupils (many of the elite Indian 
government schools use such selection devices – e.g. Rao, 2014).  This result suggests the 
better performance of private schools is likely due to greater resources which are particularly 
large in India and casts doubt on the idea that they are a possible solution to the chronic 
inefficiencies experienced in the public sector (e.g. OECD 2012). 
 
In summary, autonomous government schools seem to have significantly better managerial 
scores than regular government schools in all countries except India. Private schools, by 
contrast, are no better than government schools in any country except Brazil, implying that 
their advantages in pupil performance in Table 2 are likely to be due to selection of pupils 
from wealthier families.36 
 
What explains the advantage of autonomous government schools? 
Our results indicate that autonomous government schools are fundamentally different in 
terms of the processes that they employ in the day-by-day management of these 
organizations. In Table 4 we explore what could account for the advantage of autonomous 
government schools focusing on OECD schools because of the differences we observed 
between the OECD countries and emerging economies. Column (1) reports the baseline 
specification of column (3) of Table 3. Column (2) includes a measure of competition to see 
if some schools are in areas where there is more pupil choice.37 The measure has a positive 
																																																								
36 To account for potential differences between faith-based and non-faith-based schools, we introduce a dummy 
for faith-based schools in our sample to the full specifications in columns 3, 6, and 9. In each region the 
autonomous government school and the private school coefficients remain significant and nearly unchanged. In 
the OECD the autonomous government coefficient (standard error) changes to 0.235(0.075) and the private 
coefficient (standard error) changes to -0.019(0.094), in Brazil the autonomous government coefficient (standard 
error) changes to 0.894(0.182) and the private coefficient (standard error) changes to 0.465 (0.096), and in India, 
the autonomous government and the private coefficient remain unchanged. In our sample, 14.2% of interviews 
in the OECD, 7.8% of interviews in Brazil and 15.7% of interviews in India were run with principals of faith-
based schools. 
37 Our measure of competition is collected during the survey itself by asking the principal “How many other 
schools offering education to 15 year-olds are within a 30-minute drive from your school?” 
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but insignificant coefficient. 38 Column (3) adds in some characteristics of the principal39  
collected in the survey (tenure, gender and whether the principal has a background in STEM - 
Science, Technology, Engineering, Maths, or Business). Of these only gender is significant: 
female principals are associated with higher management scores. But these covariates only 
reduce the autonomous government coefficient slightly. Column (4) includes three measures 
of the autonomy of the principal in terms of hiring and firing, budgetary expense and 
curriculum choices. Column (5) includes both the principal characteristics and autonomy 
measures. The autonomy measures are generally insignificant with the exception of personnel 
autonomy (which is significant at the 10% level). Adding all six measures reduces the 
coefficient on the autonomous government dummies to 0.211 from 0.244 in column (1). So 
these measures of principal characteristics and autonomy do not really account for much of 
the difference. 
So what does matter? We focus on two measures (see Appendix Table A2 for details): first; 
governance - the degree to which the principal is accountable to institutional stakeholders 
such as school external boards (“Principal Accountability”); and second, leadership – the 
degree to which the principal communicates a well-articulated strategy for the school over the 
next five years (“Principal Strategy”). Column (6) includes the Principal Accountability and 
the Principal Strategy variables, showing that these variables are highly significant and these 
two factors account for almost half of the gap between autonomous government and regular 
government schools (the coefficient falls from 0.211 to 0.129).40  Table B2 shows that, 
accountability and strategy are very different between school types. When we break the 
management questions into its two different subcomponents – people and non-people 
management –, we find that the dummy capturing principals with a STEM or Business 
background is correlated with non-people practices, that is, operations, monitoring and target 
setting, but not with people management, while the opposite holds for personnel autonomy. 
38 The evidence on the impact of competition and school choice is mixed. Some studies find a positive effect 
(Hoxby 2000; Card, Dooley, and Payne 2010; Gibbons, Machin, and Silva 2008; Ahlin 2003; Hanushek and 
Rivkin 2003) while other studies find a negative effect or no effect on pupil achievement (Hsieh and Urquiola 
2006; Rothstein 2005). 
39  For instance, Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff (2009) find some evidence that experience as an assistant 
principal at the principal’s current school is associated with higher performance among inexperienced 
principals. They also find a positive relationship between principal experience and school performance, 
particularly for math test scores and pupil absences. 
40 Both are about equally important. For example, just including accountability reduces the coefficient on 
autonomous government schools from 0.211 to 0.177. 
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Appendix Table B6 shows the results for India and Brazil. Overall, these are broadly 
consistent with those shown for OECD countries. In both Brazil and India, competition, 
principal characteristics and autonomy are not significantly correlated with the management 
score, while the accountability and strategy variables appear to be large in magnitude, and 
positively and significantly correlated with higher management scores. These findings 
suggest that governance and leadership may play an important role for the performance of 
schools even in developing economies. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the factors associated with variations in school performance within and across 
countries is important. While many researchers have looked at differences in school inputs – 
such as teacher quality, class size and family/pupil characteristics – or variations in the 
institutional environment – such as pupil choice – few studies explore differences in school 
management. In this paper we show robust evidence that management practices vary 
significantly across and within countries and are strongly linked to pupil outcomes. 
Management quality seems to matter for schools. 
  
A new finding is that autonomous government schools appear to have significantly higher 
management scores than both regular government schools and private schools. Their better 
performance is not linked with autonomy per se but with how autonomy is used. Having 
strong accountability of principals to an external governing body and exercising strong 
leadership through a coherent long-term strategy for the school appear to be two key features 
that account for a large fraction of the superior management performance of such schools.  
 
From a policy point of view our findings suggest that improving management could be an 
important way of raising school standards and give broad support for the fostering of greater 
autonomy of government schools. Autonomy by itself is unlikely to deliver better results, 
however, finding ways to improve governance and motivate principals are likely to be key to 
make sure decentralized power leads to better standards. 
 
Our work suggests many lines of future inquiry. First, we have only presented conditional 
correlations. Thinking of ways to evaluate the causal effects of management interventions 
such as randomized control trials (e.g. Fryer and Holden, 2014) is a high priority. Second, we 
only account for at most half of the better management of autonomous government schools 
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with accountability and leadership: what else is important? Are there key characteristics of 
principals and teachers, for example, which we have missed out? Third, what drives 
improved school management? We have suggestive evidence that governance matters (as it 
does more widely in other sectors) but what about school networks, teacher skills, incentives, 
pupil choice and information? There is an exciting research agenda ahead. 
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORE BY COUNTRY 
 
Notes:  Data from 1,851 schools. 513 in Brazil; 146 in Canada; 140 in Germany, 318 in India, 284 in Italy, 88 
in Sweden, 92 in the UK and 270 in the US. A school level score is the simple average across all 20 questions 
and the country average (shown above) is the unweighted average of these school level scores within a country. 
FIGURE 2: PEOPLE AND NON-PEOPLE MANAGEMENT BY COUNTRY 
 
Notes:  Country-level averages for people management vs. non-people management practices. Broadly speaking 
people management involves pay, promotions, hiring and firing, while non-people involves school operations, 
monitoring and targets (see Table A1 for the precise definitions). 
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FIGURE 3: MANAGEMENT WITHIN COUNTRIES 
 
Notes:  Data from 1,851 schools showing the distribution of the firm level school scores. A smoothed kernel 
density plot of the US data is shown on each panel for easy comparison to the US management distribution. 
 
FIGURE 4: COMPARING THE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGEMENT IN 
SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN THE US AND UK 
 
Notes:  The management index is constructed from the 16 questions that overlap in all three sectors. Smoothed 
kernel density shown for each sector. 
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FIGURE 5: MANAGEMENT INDEX DIFFERENCES ACROSS SCHOOL TYPES - 
DEVIATIONS FROM COUNTRY MEANS 
 
Notes:  Data from 1,567 schools. 513 in Brazil; 146 in Canada; 140 in Germany, 318 in India, 88 in Sweden, 92 
in the UK and 270 in the US. “Aut. Gov.” are autonomous government schools, “Reg. Gov.” are regular 
government schools and “Private” are private schools. There are no autonomous government schools in Italy. 
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TABLE 1: CLASSIFICATION OF AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 
School Type Government Funding 
Curriculum 
Autonomy 
Teacher 
Selection 
Autonomy 
Pupil 
Admissions 
Autonomy 
Escolas de Referência, Brazil Most (1) Limited Limited None 
Separate Schools, Canada All Limited (4) Full Full 
Private Ersatzschulen, Germany Most (2) Limited (5) Limited (11) Limited (14) 
Private Aided Schools, India All None None Limited (15) 
Friskolor, Sweden Most (3) None Full None 
Academy Schools, UK Most (3)  Limited (6) Full Limited (16) 
Foundation Schools, UK All Limited (7) Limited (12) Limited (17) 
Voluntary Aided Schools, UK All Limited (8) Limited (13) Limited (18) 
Charter Schools, US Most (3) Limited (9) Full None 
Magnet Schools, US All Limited (10) None Limited (19) 
Notes: The Brazilian Escolas de Referência are found in Pernambuco State only. The Canadian Separate 
Schools are found in Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan only. The following explanations refer to when 
Limited Autonomy is granted to autonomous government schools in these three areas plus funding. (1) The state 
government is responsible for staff salaries, school feeding, books, and uniforms, and private funding finances 
infrastructure investments and scholarships for low-income pupils. (2) Government funding can be anywhere 
from 90% to 100%, the remaining can be from private sources. (3) May receive private donations. (4) Catholic 
concepts and values determine the orientation of the standard curriculum’s content. (5) Curriculum must have at 
least the same academic standards as government schools. (6) Follow the National Curriculum but with a 
particular focus on one or more areas. (7) May partner up with organisations to bring specific skills and 
expertise to the school. (8) Religious education may be taught according to a specific faith. (9) Must meet 
federal and state standards but innovation in the curriculum design and structure is permitted. (10) Must cover a 
set of core academic subjects, but may concentrate on a particular discipline or area of study. (11) Teachers 
must have at least the same education and earn at least the same wages as teachers in regular government 
schools. (12) Local Education Authority will appoint Head Teacher from candidates shortlisted by school. (13) 
Local Education Authority must be involved in the selection process. (14) No segregation of pupils according to 
the means of their parents. (15) Conditional on the amount of funding received by the government. (16) May 
choose up to 10% of pupils based on aptitude. (17) Cannot operate admissions outside the LEA’s coordinated 
admissions scheme. (18) Must consult other admissions authorities as well as their Diocesan Directors of 
Education when there are substantial changes. The school can use faith criteria in prioritising pupils for 
admission. (19) Most have no entrance criteria but some are highly selective.  
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TABLE 2: PUPIL OUTCOMES AND MANAGEMENT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample of countries: All All All Brazil Canada India Sweden US UK UK 
Dependent variable: Cross-country pooled pupil achievement 
Math 
Average  
Fraser 
Rating  
Average 
Math  
9th grade 
GPA 
HSEE 
Math 
Pass  
Average 
GCSE 
Context. 
Value 
Added 
Management (z-score) 0.425*** 0.242*** 0.232*** 0.104** 0.609 0.499** 0.242 0.170** 0.512* 0.881** 
(0.046) (0.041) (0.044) (0.050) (0.368) (0.243) (0.206) (0.080) (0.272) (0.369) 
Autonomous government 
school 
0.225* 0.396*** 0.235 -0.263 0.211 0.612** 0.123 0.245 -0.309 
(0.129) (0.114) (0.289) (0.467) (0.216) (0.291) (0.229) (0.319) (0.428) 
Private school 1.246*** 1.139*** 1.496*** 0.937 0.383* -0.633 
(0.081) (0.094) (0.101) (0.585) (0.208) (1.014) 
Log(pupils) 0.075* 0.126** 0.396* 0.001 0.352 0.206** -0.620 -0.566 
(0.042) (0.060) (0.213) (0.136) (0.262) (0.103) (0.441) (0.610) 
Log(pupils/teachers) -0.014 -0.118 -0.473 0.087 -0.103 -0.486 0.456 0.424 
(0.086) (0.109) (0.615) (0.188) (0.261) (0.471) (0.864) (2.426) 
Pupils selected on academic 
merit 
0.477*** 0.526*** 0.588 0.048 2.368*** 0.743** 1.145*** -0.260 
(0.109) (0.151) (0.488) (0.188) (0.496) (0.340) (0.400) (0.582) 
General controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pupil controls (cty-specific) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,002 1,002 1,002 472 77 152 82 133 86 78 
Dependent variables (mean) 514.20 5.92 69.23 211.53 69.96 442.78 1002.81 
Notes: Significance at the 1% level denoted by *** and ** for 5% and * 10% level. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. For the 
cross-country pooled measure, we use the math exam pass rate from HSEEs in US (government schools only), uncapped GCSE score in UK, Fraser Institute school rating in 
Canada, 9th grade GPA in Sweden, average math score in High School National Exam (ENEM) in Brazil, average math score in X Standards in India. In the UK we also use 
a contextual value added measure (see Appendix A for details). Pupil achievement data z-scored within country. Autonomous government schools are escolas de 
referência in Brazil, separate schools in Canada, private ersatzschulen in Germany, private-aided schools in India, friskolor in Sweden, academies, foundation, and 
voluntary-aided schools in the UK, and charter and magnet schools in the US. Management is z-score of the averaged of the z-scored 20 individual questions. All 
regressions have country dummies.  General controls: regional dummies, school curriculum (academic vs. vocational) and noise (job post and tenure of interviewee; 
interviewer dummies, day of week; time of day and interview duration and reliability measure). Pupil controls: Brazil (% of female pupils, % of foreign and naturalized 
pupils, and % of indigenous pupils), Canada (% of pupils whose 1st language is known/believed to be other than English), India (% of female pupils  and % of pupils who 
are native speakers of the local language),Sweden (% of female pupils and % of pupils whose 1st language is Swedish in Sweden), UK (% of female pupils, % of pupils 
whose 1st language is not English, % of non-white pupils, and % of pupils eligible for a school meal); and US (% of female pupils, % of non-white pupils, and % of pupils 
eligible for a school meal).        
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TABLE 3: MANAGEMENT REGRESSIONS - ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SCHOOL TYPES  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable:  Management 
Country sample: OECD OECD OECD Brazil Brazil Brazil India India India 
Autonomous government school 0.233*** 0.273*** 0.244*** 1.790*** 0.926*** 0.893*** -0.013 0.006 0.002 
 (0.086) (0.076) (0.075) (0.088) (0.179) (0.181) (0.150) (0.107) (0.110) 
Private school -0.149* 0.033 -0.004 0.504*** 0.457*** 0.471*** 0.273*** 0.015 0.008 
(0.078) (0.071) (0.076) (0.089) (0.083) (0.082) (0.074) (0.067) (0.069) 
Log(pupils) 0.141*** 0.113***  0.103* 0.125**  0.226*** 0.221*** 
(0.032) (0.033)  (0.055) (0.058)  (0.040) (0.041) 
Log(pupils/teachers) -0.163** -0.150**  -0.066 -0.079  -0.291*** -0.288*** 
(0.070) (0.070)  (0.102) (0.103)  (0.063) (0.063) 
Pupils selected on academic 0.038 0.034  0.345** 0.366**  0.232*** 0.230*** 
merits (0.088) (0.087)  (0.141) (0.144)  (0.055) (0.056) 
Regular (non-vocational) 0.170** 0.165**  0.114 0.133    
curriculum (0.073) (0.074)  (0.152) (0.152)    
Log(population density) 0.057***   -0.059   0.012 
(0.018)   (0.041)   (0.024) 
Noise controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Test Private=Aut. gov. (p-value) 0.000 0.014 0.012 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.070 0.937 0.959 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 513 513 318 318 318 318 
Notes: Significance at the 1% level denoted by *** and ** for 5% and * 10% level. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. All 
columns have country and regional controls. The Management variable takes the average of all 20 management questions. Autonomous government schools are separate 
schools in Canada, private ersatzschulen in Germany, friskolor in Sweden, academies, foundation, and voluntary-aided schools in the UK; charter and magnet schools in the 
US; escolas de referência in Brazil; private-aided schools in India. Population density is at the NUTS3 level. Noise controls include 23 interviewer dummies, day of week; 
time of day interview conducted, interview duration, reliability measure, and job post of interviewee. 
  
33 
TABLE 4: ACCOUNTING FOR THE ADVANTAGE OF AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS IN THE OECD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Management Non-People People 
Autonomous government school 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.233*** 0.223*** 0.211*** 0.129** 0.050 0.296*** 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.060) (0.061) (0.083) 
Private school -0.004 -0.006 0.013 -0.061 -0.058 -0.049 -0.193*** 0.337*** 
(0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.082) (0.083) (0.070) (0.074) (0.092) 
Log(pupils) 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.070** 0.043 0.123*** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030) (0.037) 
Log(pupils/teachers) -0.150** -0.151** -0.151** -0.158** -0.163** -0.108* -0.035 -0.252*** 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.072) (0.063) (0.063) (0.080) 
Competition 0.007 0.021 -0.006 -0.013 0.015
(0.039) (0.038) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040)
Principal tenure (years) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Principal gender (male) -0.134*** -0.142*** -0.097*** -0.108*** -0.066
(0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.038) (0.044)
Principal has STEM background 0.070 0.072 0.059 0.077* 0.012
(0.046) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) (0.049)
Principal personnel autonomy 0.059 0.065* 0.060* 0.026 0.131*** 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) 
Principal budgetary autonomy 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.015 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) 
Principal academic content autonomy -0.004 -0.004 -0.015 -0.019 0.002 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) 
Principal accountability 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.184*** 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.029) 
Principal strategy 0.236*** 0.251*** 0.161*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) 
Test Private= Aut. gov. (p-value) 0.012 0.012 0.023 0.005 0.008 0.046 0.006 0.679 
Notes: All columns have 1,020 observations. Significance at the 1% level denoted by *** and ** for 5% and * 10% level. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in 
parentheses under coefficients. All columns contain country dummies, regional dummies, population density, whether regular academic curriculum, whether pupils selected 
on academic merit and noise controls. The Management variable takes the average of all 20 management questions. Autonomous government schools are separate schools in 
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ONLINE APPENDICES: NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION UNLESS REQUESTED BY 
REFEREES 
 
APPENDIX A: DATA 
 
A1. Management Survey Data 
Table A1 lists the 20 management practices questions asked during the survey. The questions on accountability 
and strategy are in Table A2 and on autonomy in Table A3. 
 
A2. School-Level Pupil Outcome Data 
We use school performance data for all countries surveyed, except Germany for which data is not available at the 
time and for Italy for which a companion paper has been written (Di Liberto, Schivardi, and Sulis 2013). Across 
all other countries we have found two types of school performance data: 1) standardized (and sometimes 
compulsory) examination results and 2) non-standardized examination results. Below is a description of our 
school performance dataset for each country. 
Performance data for countries with a standardized examination system across regions 
 
Brazil 
For Brazilian schools, our main performance indicator is the 2011 overall school math average in the Exame 
Nacional do Ensino Médio (ENEM), a non-mandatory national exam often used as a secondary school pupil 
evaluation (and award certification for secondary school degree) and/or as a standard university entrance 
qualification test. The exam is administered by the Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais 
(INEP).  The ENEM consists of 180 multiple-choice questions equally divided into four subject areas – math 
(math and geometry), natural sciences (biology, physics and chemistry), human sciences (history, geography, 
philosophy and sociology), languages and codes (Portuguese language, literature, foreign language, physical 
education, information technology and communication) – plus a written essay. 
 
As a robustness check, we also look at the association of management with the school average in natural sciences 
and languages and codes as well as on the 9th grade average score of Prova Brasil – a national exam established 
in 2005 assessing all pupils in public education with at least 20 pupils enrolled in the grade assessed. For pupil 
characteristics used as controls in the performance regressions, such as gender composition, percentage of pupils 
with a foreign background among others which were not collected during the survey, we use INEP’s 2011 Census 
Escolar (School Census) publicly available database (www.inep.gov.br). 
 
Sweden 
We use the 9th grade GPA and the percentage of pupils qualifying for upper secondary school as the two main 
performance measures in Sweden. Both of these measures (as well as school and pupil characteristics) are 
available online at the Skolverket website (www.skolverket.se, siris.skolverket.se) for the large majority of the 
schools in our dataset. The 9th grade GPA measure consists of the sum of points for the 16 best subjects in the 
pupil's final grade. For each subject, pupils can pass, pass with merit, or pass with distinction. For a pass they 
receive 10 points, for merit pass 15 points, and for distinction 20 points. The 9th grade GPA is calculated for those 
pupils who received grades in at least one subject. The percentage of pupils qualifying for upper secondary school 
measure consists of the percentage of pupils who are eligible to apply to upper secondary school national 
programs. To be eligible, a pupil needs to receive a minimum pass in three core subjects in Swedish compulsory 
education: Swedish or Swedish as a second language, English, and math. 
 
United Kingdom 
As our main performance indicator in the UK, we use the average uncapped GCSE score which is publicly 
available in the Key Stage 4 performance tables at the National Archives at the Department of Education website 
(www.gov.uk/dfe).  
 
The proportion of pupils achieving 5 GCSEs A-C* (Level 2 threshold), and more recently, the contextual value 
added measure have been the main indicators used to assess secondary school performance in the UK. However, 
we choose to use the average uncapped GSCE score because the average uncapped GSCE score provides a fuller 
picture of the achievements of pupils of all abilities. Nonetheless, we show the effect of management on the 
contextual value added measure in our main table and on proportion of pupils achieving 5 GCSEs A-C* (Level 2 
threshold) in Table B3. 
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For pupil characteristics not collected during the survey and used as controls in the performance regressions such 
as pupil gender composition, pupil ethnicity, pupil receiving free school meals among others, we use UK LEA 
and School Information Service (LEASIS) 2009 database. 
Countries with a non-standardized examination system 
Canada 
Due to the lack of a comparable pupil examination scores across provinces in Canada, we use a rating indicator 
produced by the Fraser Institute (www.fraserinstitute.org), a Canadian think-tank that publishes school reports for 
all schools (independent, separate and public) in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario. 
This measure consists of an overall relative rating out of 10, based on standardized scores, which ranks all 
secondary schools within provinces. That is, in order for a school to show improvement in its overall rating out 
of 10, it must improve more rapidly than the average. If it improves at a rate less than the average, it will show a 
decline in its rating. The rating for each province takes a combination of several indicators of pupil achievement 
into account, including exam marks, percentage of exams failed or below standard, courses taken per pupil, gender 
gaps, graduation rates and delayed advancement rates. The rating for each province is built as follows:  
 Schools in Alberta: the overall rating out of 10 takes into account the average exam mark, the percentage
of exams failed, school vs. exam mark difference, gender gaps, no of courses taken per pupil, diploma
completion rate and delayed advancement rate.
 Schools in British Columbia: the overall rating out of 10 takes into account the average exam mark,
percentage of failed exams, school versus exam mark difference, gender gaps, graduation rate and
delayed advancement rate.
 Schools in Ontario: the overall rating out of 10 takes into account the average level Grade 9 math,
percentage of pupil passing the OSSLT, percentage of tests below standard, and gender gap.
The school reports provided by the Fraser Institute also contain the pupil characteristics data used in the 
performance regressions. 
India 
For Indian schools, we use the average math scores in the X Standard examinations as our main indicator and the 
average science, and average first language scores in the same examination for robustness checks. After the 
completion of the tenth grade, pupil in India are required to sit for national board exams or state board exams, 
depending on which central institution the school is affiliated to. These examinations consist of multiple choice 
and short and long essay questions in the fields of math, physical sciences, social sciences, and languages among 
others and are based on each board’s syllabus for Class X. The percentage scored in this examination determines 
not only the pupil’s eligibility for graduation but also which field of study such as Science, Business or Arts the 
pupil can enrol in class XI. Although the X Standards examinations are mandatory for all schools under 
government school boards, the Central Board of Secondary Education (a Pan-Indian Private School Board) has 
made this examination optional to its pupil and allowed schools to accept their internal exam scores for graduation 
since 2010. We verify whether the quality of this examination is comparable across regions by searching for the 
examination format and subjects in math across a selected number of boards, as shown in Table A4. 
The results of the X Standard examinations are not publicly available. Instead, we collected these results one 
month after the end of the survey by calling the person in charge of administering the X Standard examinations 
in each school and asking for the average score, the overall number of points possible, the number of pupil sitting 
in the examination, and the number of pupil passing the examinations for each compulsory subject in the 
examination (usually math, sciences, first language, second language). We used the same procedure to collect the 
pupil characteristics used in the performance regressions, cross-checking this information with the information 
available in the DISE database (www.dise.in). 
United States 
We construct measures of school performance using the math exam pass rate from High School Exit Exams 
(HSEEs) and End-of-Course Exams (EOCs). For robustness checks we use the science and reading exam pass 
rates. The states where performance measures were available are the following: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas 
(math and science only), California (math only), Colorado, Florida (math and reading only), Georgia (math and 
science only), Illinois, Louisiana (math and science only), Massachusetts (math and science only), Minnesota 
(math and reading only), New Jersey (math only), New York (math and science only), North Carolina (math and 
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science only), Ohio, Oklahoma (math and reading only), Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas (math and science only), 
Virginia (math and science only), Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. These measures were compiled using 
publicly available data found in the department of education websites of each state. 
 
This constructed measure of school performance gives rise to the question of whether it is a comparable measure 
to use in our analysis. Indeed, some states use HSSEs (examinations on 9th or 10th grade subjects taken by 11th 
or 12th grade pupil) where the subjects are usually grouped together as math, read, science, and social studies.  
Other states use mandatory EOC examinations to withhold pupil diplomas where pupil are tested on several topics 
within these main subjects such as Algebra, Geometry, Physics, Biology, and Chemistry (for example, Arkansas, 
New York, North Carolina, and Virginia have passing scores for separate math-related subjects so there is no 
overall passing percentage for just math).  Furthermore, some of the states administering EOC examinations have 
not started withholding diplomas yet, thus, these examinations are not mandatory.1 In Table A5, we check for the 
comparability of HSSEs and EOCs across states by examining the format and tested subjects in math for all state 
containing performance measures in our dataset.2  
 
For pupil characteristics used as controls in the performance regressions, such as gender composition, pupil 
ethnicity among others which were not collected during the survey, we use the publicly available NCES CCD 
Public School Survey Data 2008-2009 (https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/). 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
Tables B1 and B2 contain descriptive statistics from our sample. Table B3 has the robustness tests of the pupil 
performance regressions using alternative measures of school-level pupil outcomes. Table B4 has the robustness 
tests of the pupil performance regressions decomposing the management index. Table B5 disaggregates the 
management regressions in Table 3 by OECD country. Table B6 presents the specifications of Table 4 in Brazil 
and India. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C: SAMPLING FRAME 
C1. The Sampling Frame and Eligibility to Participate in the Survey 
In every country the sampling frame for the management survey included all schools offering education to 15 
year-olds (excluding special needs schools) with 50 or more pupils in total.3 In order to ensure comparability 
across countries, we refrained from saying only “secondary or high schools” because some schools educate 
children from kindergarten to the end of high school (and we did not want to exclude them from the sample). The 
source of this sampling frame by country is shown in Table C1. 
 
Interviewers were each given a randomly selected list of schools from the sampling frame. This should therefore 
be representative of the population of schools in the country. At schools, we either interviewed the principal, head-
teacher or school director, that is, the school leader at the top of the organization who is still involved in its 
management on a daily basis. The school leaders also had to be in the post for at least one year at the time of the 
interview. 
                                                        
1 The main controversy surrounding HSEEs is twofold: 1) pupils who think they might fail the test might not take 
it in the first place and instead drop out of high school and, 2) local school authorities, principals and teachers 
have an extra incentive if pupils do well so the passing/proficient percentage might be higher but so are the dropout 
rates. For more information on this topic, see Warren, Jenkins, and Kulick (2006). 
2  This table is an updated version of the table available on the following website: 
http://sites.google.com/site/highschoolexits/home/examsbystate 
3 The exception to this is India. Due to the lack of readily available sampling frames for secondary education in 
India, we constructed a sampling frame which only included schools that offered education at both the primary 
and secondary level, that is, the grades/level offered by the school included primary as well as secondary education 
(list of schools available at the District Information System for Education website). We were able to complement 
this sampling frame with the database of the two pan-Indian school networks, the Central Board for Secondary 
Education and the Indian Council of Secondary Education, which comprised of all secondary member schools, 
including schools only offering secondary education. 
 34 
 
 
Table C2 shows the number of schools in the sampling frame. The median schools in the UK, Italy (information 
available for public schools only), and Germany are larger as measured by the number of pupil in the schools 
while the median schools in Brazil and India are the smallest. In terms of the percentage of schools which are 
funded and managed exclusively by government authorities (this excludes escolas de referência in Brazil, separate 
schools in Canada, private ersatzschulen in Germany, private aided schools in India, friskolor in Sweden, 
academies, foundation schools and voluntary aided schools in the UK, and charter and magnet schools in the US), 
the UK has the smallest share (46%) while Sweden has the largest share (88%). 
 
C2. The Survey Response Rates 
Table C3 shows the survey response rates by country. The first column of each country represents all schools in 
the randomly selected list of schools given to the interviewers as described above. The second column represents 
all schools eligible for the interview. The eligibility criteria were confirmed by the interviewer during the process 
of contacting and scheduling the interview. In terms of interviews completed, we managed to obtain a response 
rate ranging from 58% and 42% of eligible schools in Brazil and India, respectively, to 8% of eligible schools in 
the UK. In contrast, the explicit refusal rate was generally low across all countries surveyed, ranging from 2% of 
all eligible schools in Sweden to 16% of all eligible schools in Germany. 
 
The high response rate in Brazil and India was due to greater persistence in following up non-respondents in order 
to meet the target numbers we were aiming for and to the fact that most principals interviewed in these countries 
responded with a scheduled time and date soon after the first or second contact with the interviewer. As for the 
UK, there are a number of possible reasons for why the response rate was lower, including the proliferation of 
cold-calling and the increasing number of telephone surveys in schools in the UK (which makes running telephone 
surveys harder as switchboards more aggressively screen out calls), the domestic bias (phoning UK schools from 
the UK representing a study from a UK University is less impressive than, for example, phoning Brazilian schools 
from the UK), and principals’ slow turnaround time for a response after the initial contact by interviewers (which 
was common throughout the North American and European countries surveyed). 
 
“Scheduling in progress” indicates schools which have been contacted by an interviewer and which have not 
refused to be interviewed (for example they may schedule an interview but cancel or postpone it or simply take 
more time to respond). The high share of “scheduling in progress” schools was due to the need for interviewers 
to keep a stock of between 100 to 300 schools to cycle though when trying to arrange interviews. Since 
interviewers only ran an average of 1.4 interviews a day the majority of their time was spent trying to contact 
principals to schedule future interviews. The optimal level of this stock varied by the country: many US and 
Canadian managers operated voicemail, so that large stocks of firms were needed, while UK managers typically 
had personnel assistants rather than voicemail, who wanted to see Government endorsement materials before 
connecting with the managers. In addition, in the North American and European countries, a portion of the survey 
wave took place when principals were on holiday during the summer months. Unfortunately, the survey ended 
before these principals could be interviewed, which left large stocks of initially contacted schools without 
possibility of following up but were still considered under the “scheduling in progress” category. 
 
The ratio of successful interviews to rejections (ignoring “scheduling in progress”) is above 1 in every country, 
except in the UK. Hence, managers typically agreed to the survey proposition when interviewers were able to 
connect with them. This agreement ratio is lowest in the UK for the same reasons the response rate was lower: 
proliferation of phone surveys, domestic bias, personal assistants acting as tough gatekeepers, and slow turnaround 
time for a response after initial contact. 
 
Finally, after initial contact, many schools were deemed not eligible for an interview, that is, the information in 
the sampling frame wrongly reported these schools as offering general education to 15-year-olds or enrolling more 
than 50 pupils in the sampling frames, or interviewer verified that the principal had been in the post for less than 
one year. One of the reasons for a lower average of school interviews conducted per day in comparison to the 
average for our manufacturing interviews (2.8 per day) is the fact that analysts spent a significant time on the 
phone screening out non-eligible schools. 
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C3. Selection Analysis 
Panel A of Table C4 analyses the probability of being interviewed. 4 Within each country, we compare the 
responding schools with those eligible schools in the sampling frame - including “interviews refused” and 
“scheduling in progress” but removing “schools not eligible” for the survey - against three types of selection bias:  
size (number of pupils), ownership (share of regular government schools) and population density (number of 
habitants per square kilometer) by state, province, or NUTS 2 region as a measure of location. 
 
Looking at the overall pattern of results, there are very few significant coefficients and the marginal effects are 
small in magnitude. First, there is a tendency for larger schools to be more likely to respond, although this is only 
significant in Canada. The US is unusual in that smaller schools are significantly more likely to be interviewed.5 
Second, government schools were no more likely to respond, except in India. Third, schools in densely populated 
areas tended to be less likely to respond, although this only significant at the 5% level in India6 and only at the 
10% level in the US and Brazil. 
 
To address selection concerns, we used the regressions in Table C4 to construct sampling weights. We then plot 
our cross-country ranking using the estimated weights. We found that the rankings across countries for the 
unweighted scores in Figure 1 were very robust when using these alternative sample weighting schemes. For 
example, Figure C1 below gives the equivalent of Figure 1 using the weights from Panel A of Table C4.  
 
Panel B of Table C4 analyses the probability of being interviewed and of having pupil outcome measures publicly 
available. Within each country, we compare these schools with eligible school in the rest of the sampling frame, 
including schools for which we have a management interview against the same three types of selection bias as 
specified in Panel A. First, the results indicate that larger schools are more likely to have pupil outcomes data 
available in Canada (where performance data is only available in three major provinces) and the UK and (albeit 
we have performance data for 86 of the 92 schools interviewed) while smaller schools in India are more likely to 
have pupil outcome data (where data was collected through a short school performance telephone survey). 
Nonetheless, the coefficient magnitudes are small. Second, regular government schools in Brazil and the US are 
more likely to have pupil outcomes data available, however the magnitude of the coefficient in Brazil is small (we 
have performance data for 472 of the 513 schools interviewed) while the larger coefficient in the US reflects the 
unavailability of data for non-regular government schools for the majority of states. Third, schools in densely 
populated areas are more likely to have pupil outcomes data available in Canada and the UK, while schools in 
less populated areas are more likely to have pupil outcomes data in India (although this is marginally significant 
in the UK and India). 
                                                        
4 Note this sample is smaller than the total survey sample because we do not have enrolment or ownership data 
for all schools in our survey sample. 
5 The reason for this is that many US principals from smaller schools did not have assistants who could potentially 
block our calls. Instead, many principals display their direct lines on the schools websites, which made it easier 
for our interviewers to reach them. 
6 For our Indian random survey sample, private school phone numbers (from CBSE and ICSE databases) were 
available while no phone numbers were available for government schools (from the DISE database). For many 
schools, we were not able to find either phone numbers or any information online and, thus, we were not able to 
verify whether these schools were still functioning. The interviewers were instructed to categorize these schools 
as out-of-business/no phone number found (that is, not eligible for the survey), thus decreasing the share of 
government schools in the eligible school sample. As interviewers were instructed to persistently call government 
schools in order to balance the sample, we now see a higher marginal effect of being interviewed which is inflated 
due to the fact that we had a much lower share of government schools in the eligible sample.  
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FIGURE B1: PEOPLE AND NON-PEOPLE MANAGEMENT WITHIN COUNTRIES 
 
Notes:  Data from 1,851 obs. (513 BR, 146 CA, 140 GE, 318 IN, 284 IT, 88 SW, 92 UK, 270 US schools). 
 
FIGURE C1: CROSS COUNTRY AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES CORRECTED FOR 
SAMPLING RESPONSE RATES 
 
Notes: Average management score using sample weights constructed from the sample selection model in Table 
C4. Data from 1,851 obs. (513 BR, 146 CA, 140 GE, 318 IN, 284 IT, 88 SW, 92 UK, 270 US schools). 
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TABLE A1: LIST OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
Operations: 
Q1. Standardization of 
Instructional Planning 
Processes 
Measures how well materials and practices are standardized and aligned in order to 
be capable of moving pupils through learning pathways over time 
Q2. Personalization of 
Instruction and Learning 
Measures for flexibility in teaching methods and pupil involvement ensuring all 
individuals can master the learning objectives 
Q3. Data-Driven Planning 
and Pupil Transitions 
Measures if the school uses assessment to verify learning outcomes at critical stages, 
make data easily available and adapt pupil strategies accordingly  
Q4. Adopting Educational 
Best Practices 
Measures how well the school incorporates teaching best practices and the sharing 
of these resources into the classroom  
 
Monitoring: 
Q5. Continuous 
Improvement 
Measures attitudes towards process documentation and continuous improvement 
Q6. Performance 
Tracking 
Measures whether school performance is measured with the right methods and 
frequency  
Q7. Performance Review Measures whether performance is reviewed with appropriate frequency and follow-
up 
Q8. Performance Dialogue Measures the quality of review conversations 
Q9. Consequence 
Management 
Measures whether differing levels of school performance (not only individual teacher 
performance) lead to different consequences 
 
Target Setting: 
Q10. Target Balance Measures whether the system tracks meaningful targets tied to pupil outcomes 
Q11. Target 
Interconnection 
Measures whether the school and individual targets are aligned with each other and 
the overall system goals 
Q12. Time Horizon of 
Targets 
Measures whether the school has a rational approach to planning and setting the 
targets 
Q13. Target Stretch Measures whether targets are appropriately difficult to achieve 
Q14. Clarity and 
Comparability of Targets 
Measures how easily understandable performance measures are and whether 
performance is openly communicated 
 
People/Talent Management: 
Q15. Rewarding High 
Performers 
Measures whether good teacher performance is rewarded proportionately 
Q16. Fixing Poor 
Performers 
Measures whether the school is able to deal with underperformers 
Q17. Promoting High 
Performers 
Measures whether promotions and career progression are based on performance 
Q18. Managing Talent 
 
Measures how well the school identifies and targets needed teaching, leadership and 
other capacity in the school 
Q19. Retaining Talent Measures whether the school will go out of its way to keep its top talent 
Q20. Creating a 
Distinctive Employee 
Value Proposition 
Measures how strong the teacher value proposition is to work in the individual school 
Notes:  Detailed survey instrument available at www.worldmanagementsurvey.org 
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TABLE A2: PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP & ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES 
 
Leadership Vision & 
Strategy 
Measures whether schools leaders have an understanding of the broader set of 
challenges that the school, system and key actors face and the right mind-set to 
address them by checking whether the vision is clearly defined, set with the 
collaboration of a wide range of stakeholders, broadly communicated, linked to pupil 
outcomes and built upon a keen understanding of community needs. 
Clearly Defined 
Accountability for School 
Leaders 
Measures whether school leaders are accountable for delivery of targets (including 
quality, equity, and cost-effectiveness of pupil outcomes), are held responsible with 
both school and individual-level consequences for good and bad performance, and 
are autonomous in order to make decision that will directly affect the outcomes of 
these targets. 
Notes: All questions are scored on a 1 to 5 scale with 1=lowest scores and 5=highest score. Detailed survey 
instrument available at www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. 
 
 
TABLE A3: PRINCIPAL AUTONOMY MEASURES 
 
Personnel Autonomy To hire a full-time teacher what agreement would you need? 
Budgetary Autonomy What is the largest capital investment you can make without prior authorization from 
outside? 
Academic Content 
Autonomy 
To add a new class - for example, introducing a new language such as Mandarin - 
what agreement would you need? 
Notes: To measure the degree of autonomy we use a 1-5 scale where 1 refers to no authority to make any 
decision and 5 refers to complete authority to make any decision. Detailed survey instrument available at 
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org 
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TABLE A4: INDIA X STANDARD EXAMS (CLASS 10) 
State Test Name Cove
rage 
Man
dator
y? 
Test Format for 
Mathematics 
Test Subjects for Mathematics 
AP Andhra Pradesh Board of 
Intermediate Education 
10 Yes Short Answer and Constructed 
Response 
Algebra, Vector Algebra, Trigonometry, Calculus, Coordinate Geometry 
GJ Gujarat Board of Secondary 
Education 
10 Yes Multiple Choice, Short 
Answer, Very Short Answer 
and Constructed Response 
Number system, Algebra (Polynomials, Rational Expressions, Linear 
Equation, Quadratic Equations), Arithmetic Progression, Accounting 
(Instalments, Income Tax), Mensuration, Trigonometry, Coordinate 
Geometry. 
HR Haryana Board of Education 10 Yes Multiple Choice, Short 
Answer, Very Short Answer 
and Constructed Response 
Number system (Real Numbers), Algebra (Polynomials, Linear Equation, 
Quadratic Equations), Arithmetic Progression, Trigonometry (Triangles), 
Coordinate Geometry 
J&K J & K State Board of School 
Education 
10 Yes Multiple Choice and 
Constructed Response 
Algebra, Probability, Mensuration, Trigonometry, Coordinate Geometry, 
Accounting (Instalments, Interest Rates) 
KA Secondary School Leaving 
Certificate 
10 Yes Multiple Choice, Very Short 
Answer, Constructed 
Response 
Algebra, Mensuration, Coordinate Geometry 
MH The Maharashtra State 
Secondary School Certificate 
10 Yes 
 
 Number system, Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, Mensuration, Statistics, 
Graphs and Coordinate Geometry 
CBSE All India Secondary School 
Examination 
10 No Multiple Choice, Short 
Answer, Very Short Answer 
and Constructed Response 
Algebra, Geometry, Mensuration, Trigonometry, Coordinate Geometry, 
Probability 
ISCE Indian School Certificate 
Examination 
10 Yes Short Answer, Very Short 
Answer, Constructed 
Response. 
Number system, Algebra, Mensuration, Coordinate Geometry, Accounting 
(Interest Rates), Trigonometry, Probability. 
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TABLE A5: UNITED STATES HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS (HSEEs) AND END OF COURSE EXAMS (EOCs) 
State Test Name Coverage Man
dator
y? 
Test Format for 
Mathematics 
Test Subjects for Mathematics 
AL Alabama High School 
Graduation Exam (AHSGE) 
11, 12 Yes Multiple choice Algebra and Pre-Geometry 
AZ Arizona's Instrument to Measure 
Standards (AIMS) 
9, 10, 11, 
12 
Yes Multiple choice Algebra I & II and Geometry 
AR End Of Course Exams (EOC) HS Yes Multiple Choice and 
Constructed Response 
Statistics, Data Analysis, Probability, Measurement and Geometry,  Number 
Sense,  Mathematical Reasoning, Algebra 
CA California High School Exit 
Examination (CAHSEE) 
10, 11, 12 Yes Multiple Choice Number Sense, Algebra, Probability, Geometry and Measurement, Problem 
- Solving,  
FL Florida's Comprehensive 
Assessment Test (FCAT) 
10 Yes Multiple Choice, 
Performance Tasks, 
Gridded Response 
Number and Operations, Measurement, Geometry and Spatial Sense, 
Patterns, Functions, and Algebra, Data Analysis, Probability and Statistics 
GA Georgia High School 
Graduation Tests (GHSGT) 
11 Yes Multiple Choice Number and Computation, Geometry and Measurement, Algebra, Data 
Analysis 
IL Prairie State Achievement 
Examination (PSAE) 
11 No Multiple Choice Number Sense, Estimation and Measurement, Algebra and Analytical 
Methods, Geometry, Data Analysis and Probability 
LA Graduation Exit Exam (GEE) 10 (Eng & 
math), 11 
(sci & soc) 
Yes Multiple Choice and 
Constructed Response 
Number Sense, Concepts, and Applications; Spatial Sense and Geometry; 
Data Analysis, Probability, Statistics, and Discrete Math; Patterns, 
Functions, and Algebra 
MA Massachusetts Comprehensive 
Assessment System (MCAS) 
9/10 (sci), 
10 (ela & 
math) 
Yes Multiple Choice, Short 
Answer, Open Response 
Algebra, Functions, and Graphs; Geometry and Trigonometry; Data 
Analysis and Probability;  
MN Graduation Required 
Assessment for Diploma 
(GRAD) 
11 math), 
10 (read), 
9 (write) 
Yes Multiple Choice Numbers and Operations; Geometry and Measurement; Data Analysis and 
Probability; Algebra 
NJ High School Proficiency Exam 
(HSPA) 
11 Yes Multiple Choice and 
Open Ended 
Algebra I 
NM New Mexico High School 
Standards Assessment 
(NMHSSA) 
11 No Multiple Choice and 
Constructed Response 
Algebra I, Geometry and Measurement, Probability and Statistics, Math 
Processes and Tools 
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NY New York State Education 
Department Regents 
Examinations (NYSEDRE) 
HS Yes Multiple Choice and 
Short Answer 
Numbers and Operations; Algebraic Reasoning; Geometric Reasoning and 
Measurement; Data, Statistics, and Probability  
NC North Carolina End of Course 
Exams (NC EOC) 
HS Yes Multiple Choice Algebra I, Geometry, Algebra II 
OH Ohio Graduations Tests (OGT) 10 Yes Multiple Choice and 
Constructed Response 
Mathematical Processes, Numerical Operations and Relationships, 
Geometry, Measurement, Statistics and Probability, Algebraic Relationships  
OK Oklahoma Core Curriculum 
Tests (OCCT-EOI) 
9, 10, 11, 
12 
Yes Multiple Choice Number operations and concepts, Geometry, Measurement, Algebra, Data 
Analysis and Probability 
OR Oregon Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills (OAKS) 
10 No Multiple Choice Numeration, Measurement, Estimation, Functions, Geometry, Probability 
PA Pennsylvania System of School 
Assessment (PSSA) 
11 Yes Multiple Choice and 
Open Ended 
Numbers and Operations, Algebraic Concepts, Geometry, Measurement and 
Data, Data Analysis and Probability 
TX Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) 
11 Yes Multiple Choice and 
Short Answer 
Algebra 1 
VA Standards of Learning Tests 
(SOL) 
EOC Yes Multiple Choice Number and Operations; Geometry and Measurement; Functions and 
Algebra; Data, Statistics, and Probability 
WA Washington Assessment of 
Student Learning (WASL) 
10 Yes Multiple Choice, Short 
Answer, and Constructed 
Response 
Number and Operations, Geometry, Data Analysis, Statistics and 
Probability; Measurement; Algebra, Functions, and Patterns 
WI Wisconsin Knowledge Concepts 
Exams (WKCE) 
10 No Multiple Choice Number and Operations; Geometry and Measurement; Functions and 
Algebra; Statistics and Probability 
WY Proficiency Assessments for 
Wyoming Students (PAWS) 
11 No Multiple Choice and 
Constructed Response 
Number and Operations, Algebra, Geometry and Measurement, Statistics 
and Probability 
Notes: Information on HSEEs and EOCs for the year of the survey (2009).
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TABLE B1: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Dev. Min. Max. Obs 
Average Management Score 2.27 0.612 1.00 4.15 1851 
Average People Score 2.00 0.624 1.00 4.00 1851 
Average Non-People Score 2.39 0.658 1.00 4.37 1851 
Performance Measures (for 1,002 schools)           
Average Management Score 2.27 0.649 1.00 4.15 1002 
HSNE (ENEM) Average Math Score 514.20 74.326 328.10 774.69 472 
Rating 5.92 2.013 0.00 10.00 77 
X Standards Average Math Score 69.23 8.289 50.00 90.00 152 
9th Grade GPA 211.53 20.992 122.00 274.20 83 
HSEE Math Pass Rate 69.96 23.119 0.00 100.00 133 
Average Uncapped GCSE Score 442.78 75.543 299.80 645.80 86 
Contextual Value Added 1002.81 17.258 957.60 1044.50 78 
Ownership and Governance           
Share of Private Schools 0.27 0.443 0.00 1.00 1851 
Share of Autonomous Government Schools 0.06 0.244 0.00 1.00 1851 
Share of Regular Government Schools 0.67 0.471 0.00 1.00 1851 
Leadership           
Principal Strategy 2.62 0.850 1.00 5.00 1851 
Principal Accountability 2.22 0.843 1.00 5.00 1851 
Autonomy           
Personnel Autonomy 2.76 1.665 1.00 5.00 1851 
Academic Content Autonomy 2.89 1.473 1.00 5.00 1847 
Capital (Budgetary) Autonomy 5966.75 16551.250 0.00 178019.10 1732 
School Characteristics           
Number of Pupils 6.35 0.874 2.30 8.58 1851 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 2.64 0.550 0.01 5.24 1851 
Share of Schools with a Regular Curriculum (as 
opposed to Vocational) 0.92 0.264 0.00 1.00 1851 
Share of Schools with Pupil Selection based on 
Academics 0.24 0.426 0.00 1.00 1408 
Principal Characteristics           
Number of Years in Post (Tenure) 6.56 6.224 1.00 52.00 1850 
Share of Male Principals 0.56 0.496 0.00 1.00 1851 
Share of Principals with a 
Science/Tech./Eng./Maths/Business Degree 0.32 0.468 0.00 1.00 1690 
Geographical Control           
Population Density (number of people/Km2) 704.75 2911.378 0.00 56348.08 1764 
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TABLE B2: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIVATE, AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT AND REGULAR GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS (IN DEVIATIONS 
FROM COUNTRY MEANS) 
  Panel A: OECD   Panel B: Brazil   Panel C: India 
 Private 
Autonomous 
Gov. 
Regular 
Gov.  Private 
Autonomous 
Gov. 
Regular 
Gov.  Private 
Autonomous 
Gov. 
Regular 
Gov. 
            
Management 0.98 1.05 1.00  1.12 1.42 0.95  1.04 0.95 0.94 
            
Pupils 0.87 1.00 1.03  0.95 1.01 1.02  1.02 1.03 0.96 
Pupils/teachers 0.86 1.03 1.02  0.88 1.17 1.04  0.98 1.05 1.02 
Regular curriculum 1.02 1.02 0.99  1.04 1.05 0.99  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Academic selection 2.31 0.66 0.75  2.39 0.00 0.49  1.13 0.76 0.83 
Population density in region 1.17 1.07 0.96  1.33 0.13 0.89  1.01 1.04 0.98 
            
Number of competitors 1.14 1.00 0.97  1.22 0.77 0.92  1.02 1.02 0.96 
            
Principal tenure (years) 1.44 0.95 0.91  1.65 0.95 0.76  1.14 1.12 0.73 
Principal gender (male) 1.00 0.88 1.02  0.95 1.04 1.02  0.86 1.08 1.22 
Principal has STEM background 1.03 1.12 0.98  0.76 1.20 1.09  0.99 1.14 0.99 
            
Principal personnel autonomy 1.71 1.09 0.84  2.23 1.22 0.54  1.25 1.06 0.57 
Principal budgetary autonomy 1.05 0.99 0.99  1.89 2.72 0.71  1.08 0.88 0.90 
Principal academic content autonomy 1.17 1.05 0.96  1.97 1.52 0.64  1.19 1.06 0.67 
            
Principal strategy 0.92 1.06 1.01  1.05 1.21 0.98  1.04 0.81 0.96 
Principal accountability 1.02 1.03 0.99  1.29 1.48 0.89  1.08 0.84 0.90 
            
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020   513 513 513   318 318 318 
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TABLE B3: PUPIL OUTCOMES AND MANAGEMENT – ALTERNATIVE MEASURES 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sample of countries: Brazil Brazil India India Sweden UK US US 
Dependent variable: 
Natural 
Sciences 
Average 
(ENEM) 
Portuguese 
& Math 
Average 
(Prova 
Brasil) 
Average 
Science 
Average 
First 
Language 
% 
qualifying 
for upper 
sec. school 
% 
achieving 5 
GCSEs A-
C* 
HSEE 
Science 
Pass 
HSEE 
Reading 
Pass 
Management (z-score) 0.120** 0.190* 0.495** 0.402 0.286 0.399 0.079 0.333** 
 (0.055) (0.113) (0.247) (0.333) (0.224) (0.249) (0.069) (0.140) 
Autonomous government school 0.064 0.007 0.412* 0.192 0.055 0.040 0.155 -0.182 
 (0.361) (0.390) (0.223) (0.237) (0.345) (0.246) (0.146) (0.349) 
Private school 1.535***  0.197 -0.299  0.004   
 (0.105)  (0.205) (0.313)  (0.892)   
Log(pupils) 0.186*** 0.053 0.095 0.332 0.550* -0.532 0.054 0.195 
 (0.059) (0.127) (0.119) (0.201) (0.286) (0.340) (0.074) (0.167) 
Log(pupils/teachers) -0.132 -0.038 -0.003 0.100 -0.057 0.741 -0.345 -0.652 
 (0.104) (0.222) (0.212) (0.274) (0.287) (0.765) (0.224) (0.658) 
Pupils selected on academic merit 0.477*** -0.448 -0.042 -0.225 0.018 1.254*** 0.096 -0.794 
 (0.155) (0.334) (0.172) (0.218) (0.611) (0.322) (0.242) (0.485) 
General controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pupil controls (country-specific) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 472 263 152 152 82 86 105 72 
Notes: Significance at the 1% level denoted by *** and ** for 5% and * 10% level. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. We use the 
science and reading exam pass rates from HSEEs in US (government schools only), contextual value added and % of pupils achieving 5 GCSEs A-C* (Level 2 threshold) in 
UK, % of pupils qualifying for upper secondary school in Sweden, natural sciences in High School National Exam (ENEM) and Portuguese and math average in Prova Brasil 
in Brazil, X Standards Average science and first language score in India (Appendix A). Pupil achievement data z-scored within country. Autonomous government schools are 
escolas de referência in Brazil, private-aided schools in India, friskolor in Sweden, academies, foundation, and voluntary-aided schools in the UK, and charter and magnet 
schools in the US. Management is z-score of the averaged of the z-scored 20 individual questions. General controls: regional dummies, school curriculum (academic vs. 
vocational) and noise (job post and tenure of interviewee; interviewer dummies, day of week; time of day and interview duration and reliability measure). Pupil controls: 
Brazil (% of female pupils, % of foreign and naturalized pupils, and % of indigenous pupils), Canada (% of pupils whose 1st language is known/believed to be other than 
English), India (% of female pupils  and % of pupils who are native speakers of the local language), Sweden (% of female pupils and % of pupils whose 1st language is Swedish 
in Sweden), UK (% of female pupils, % of pupils whose 1st language is not English, % of non-white pupils, and % of pupils eligible for a school meal); and US (% of female 
pupils, % of non-white pupils, and % of pupils eligible for a school meal).  
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TABLE B4: PUPIL OUTCOMES AND MANAGEMENT – DECOMPOSITIONS OF MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: Cross-country pooled measure of pupil achievement (z-scored) 
Management (z-score) 0.232***       
 (0.044)       
Operations (z-scored)  0.093**      
  (0.036)      
Monitoring (z-scored)   0.133***     
   (0.036)     
Targets (z-scored)    0.158***    
   (0.038)    
People (z-scored)     0.257***   
     (0.046)   
Comparable 
Management (z-scored) 
     0.248***  
     (0.045)  
Dobbie-Fryer Index       0.134*** 
       (0.038) 
Autonomous government 
school 
0.396*** 0.433*** 0.428*** 0.427*** 0.365*** 0.391*** 0.426*** 
(0.114) (0.117) (0.117) (0.115) (0.113) (0.114) (0.117) 
Private school 1.139*** 1.201*** 1.205*** 1.224*** 1.015*** 1.131*** 1.175*** 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.100) (0.094) (0.096) 
Log(pupils) 0.075* 0.088** 0.093** 0.087** 0.072* 0.077* 0.084** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
Log(pupils/teachers) -0.014 -0.023 -0.037 -0.022 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) 
Pupils selected on 
academic merit 
0.477*** 0.504*** 0.512*** 0.489*** 0.453*** 0.473*** 0.503*** 
(0.109) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) 
Observations 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 
Notes: Significance at the 1% level denoted by *** and ** for 5% and * 10% level. OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. General controls and country dummies in all columns. We use 
the math exam pass rate from HSEEs in US (government schools only), uncapped GCSE score in UK, Fraser 
Institute school rating in Canada, 9th grade GPA in Sweden, average math score in High School National Exam 
(ENEM) in Brazil, average math score in X Standards in India (see Appendix A for details). Pupil achievement 
data z-scored within country. Autonomous government schools are escolas de referência in Brazil, separate 
schools in Canada, private ersatzschulen in Germany, private-aided schools in India, friskolor in Sweden, 
academies, foundation, and voluntary-aided schools in the UK, and charter and magnet schools in the US.  The 
Management variable takes the average of all 20 management questions. The Non-People variable takes the 
average of all non-people practices, that is, all operations management, performance management, and target 
setting questions listed in Table A1 (Qs 1 to 14) in the Appendix. The People variable takes the average of all 
people related management questions in Table A1 (Qs 15 to 20) in the Appendix. The Comparable Management 
variable takes the average of 16 questions common to the school survey and surveys in other sectors in Table A1 
in the Appendix (Qs 5 to 20, that is, all monitoring, target setting and people management questions). The Dobbie-
Fryer Index takes the average of 3 management questions: “Q3 - Data-driven Planning and Pupil Transitions”, 
“Q4 - Adopting Education Best Practices”, “Q2 - Personalization of Instruction and Learning”, and 1 leadership 
question: “Clearly Defined Accountability for Principals”. General controls are regional dummies, school 
curriculum (academic vs. vocational) and noise controls (job post and tenure of interviewee; up to 40 interviewer 
dummies, day of week; time of day interview conducted, interview duration and reliability measure).      
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TABLE B5: MANAGEMENT REGRESSIONS BY OECD COUNTRY 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample of countries: All Canada Germany Italy Sweden UK US 
All OECD 
except 
Sweden 
Dependent variable: Management (z-score) 
         
Autonomous government school 0.244*** 0.030 0.237  0.430** 0.213 0.111 0.141* 
 (0.075) (0.100) (0.204)  (0.185) (0.154) (0.228) (0.077) 
Private school -0.004 0.176 0.790 0.007  -0.055 -0.194 -0.009 
 (0.076) (0.189) (0.498) (0.144)  (0.448) (0.143) (0.079) 
Log(pupils) 0.113*** 0.028 0.168 0.054 -0.057 0.678*** 0.133** 0.128*** 
 (0.033) (0.056) (0.116) (0.076) (0.139) (0.173) (0.067) (0.035) 
Log(pupils/teachers) -0.150** 0.123 -0.167 -0.134 -0.237 -0.545 -0.179 -0.152** 
 (0.070) (0.142) (0.363) (0.123) (0.151) (0.615) (0.161) (0.075) 
Pupils selected on academic merits 0.034 0.153 0.083 -0.032 0.338 0.037 0.084 0.060 
 (0.087) (0.134) (0.285) (0.184) (0.309) (0.240) (0.272) (0.088) 
Regular (non-vocational) curriculum 0.165**  0.134 0.170**    0.164** 
 (0.074)  (0.179) (0.084)    (0.074) 
Log(population density) 0.057*** 0.030 0.080* -0.014 0.226* -0.038 0.086** 0.054*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.048) (0.057) (0.132) (0.051) (0.035) (0.018) 
         
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Test Private=Autonomous gov.: p-value 0.028 0.438 0.303   0.503 0.192 0.128 
Observations 1,020 146 140 284 88 92 270 932 
Notes: Significance at the 1% level denoted by *** and ** for 5% and * 10% level. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. Autonomous 
government schools are separate schools in Canada, private ersatzschulen in Germany, friskolor in Sweden, academies, foundation, and voluntary-aided schools in the UK, 
and charter and magnet schools in the US. Column (1) includes country dummies. Population density is at the NUTS3 level. Noise controls include up to 23 interviewer 
dummies, day of week; time of day interview conducted, interview duration, reliability measure, and job post of interviewee.
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TABLE B6: EXPLAINING THE ADVANTAGE OF AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS: 
PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP IN BRAZIL AND INDIA 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Sample of countries: Brazil  India 
Dependent variable:  
Management 
(z-scored) 
Management 
(z-scored)   
Management 
(z-scored) 
Management 
(z-scored) 
      
Autonomous government school 0.893*** 0.436**  0.002 0.055 
 (0.181) (0.198)  (0.110) (0.095) 
Private school 0.471*** -0.030  0.008 -0.076 
 (0.082) (0.137)  (0.069) (0.061) 
Log(pupils) 0.125** 0.078  0.221*** 0.171*** 
 (0.058) (0.048)  (0.041) (0.036) 
Log(pupils/teachers) -0.079 -0.061  -0.288*** -0.134** 
 (0.103) (0.086)  (0.063) (0.053) 
Competition  -0.017   0.054 
  (0.042)   (0.046) 
Principal tenure (years)  -0.006**   -0.004 
  (0.003)   (0.004) 
Principal gender (male)  -0.036   -0.058 
  (0.053)   (0.048) 
Principal has STEM background  0.054   -0.011 
  (0.056)   (0.045) 
Principal personnel autonomy  0.023   -0.010 
  (0.063)   (0.036) 
Principal budgetary autonomy  0.043   0.015 
  (0.031)   (0.034) 
Principal academic content  0.038   0.018 
autonomy  (0.047)   (0.029) 
Principal accountability  0.361***   0.283*** 
  (0.033)   (0.040) 
Principal strategy  0.307***   0.184*** 
  (0.031)   (0.038) 
      
Regional dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Noise controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Test Private= Aut. gov.: p-value 0.005 0.000  0.666 0.208 
Observations 513 513   318 318 
Notes: Significance at the 1% level denoted by *** and ** for 5% and * 10% level. OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. The Management variable takes the average of all 20 
management questions. Autonomous government schools are escolas de referência in Brazil and private-aided 
schools in India. Population density is at the NUTS3 level. Noise controls include 17 interviewer dummies, day 
of week; time of day interview conducted, interview duration, reliability measure, and job post of interviewee. 
The competition variable is collected during the survey itself by asking the principal “How many other schools 
offering education to 15 year-olds are within a 30-minute drive from your school?” STEM background refers to 
principals with a background in Science, Technology, Engineering, Maths, and Business. The autonomy questions 
were asked and measured during the survey. For personnel autonomy, we ask “To hire a full-time teacher what 
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agreement would you need?, for budgetary autonomy, we ask “What is the largest capital investment you can 
make without prior authorization from outside?” and for academic content autonomy, we ask “To add a new class 
- for example, introducing a new language such as Mandarin - what agreement would you need?”. To measure 
the degree of autonomy we use a 1-5 scale where 1 refers to no authority to make any decision and 5 refers to 
complete authority to make any decision. Principal accountability variable measures the degree to which the 
principal is responsible for delivering the school targets and the principal strategy variable measures the degree to 
which the principal communicates a well-established strategy for the school for the next 5 years. 
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TABLE C1: SAMPLING FRAME SOURCES 
Brazil Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais (INEP) 
Canada Scott’s Directories (Private company compiling information for all schools in Canada) 
India 
District Information System for Education (DISE) 
Central Board for Secondary Education (CBSE) 
Indian Council of Secondary Education (ICSE) 
Italy Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca 
Sweden Skolverket (Swedish National Agency for Education) 
Germany Various state departments 
United States National Center for Education Statistics  
United Kingdom Department for Education 
 
 
TABLE C2: THE SAMPLING FRAME 
 BR CA DE IN IT SE UK US 
Number of schools (#) 28,390 4,122 7,184 49,856 4,954 4,142 4,243 24,301 
Pupils (median) 258 
300-
499 
579 218 745 209 845 407 
Regular Government Schools 
(%) 
71.5   77.1 65.1 66.5 87.8 45.9 65.4 
Notes: BR=Brazil, CA=Canada, DE=Germany, IN=India, IT=Italy, SE=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, 
US=United States. Sampling frame is the total number of schools eligible for the survey. The sampling frame 
includes all schools with 50 or more pupil offering education to 15 year-olds. Pupils is the median number of 
pupil in the school. When this information was not available, the school was kept in the sampling frame. The 
number of pupil is available for 97% of the sampling frame in Canada, 64% of the sampling frame in Germany 
(information available for BA, BR, BW, NRW, SH states only), for 85% of the sampling frame in India, 68% of 
the sampling frame in Italy (information available for government schools only), 95% of the sampling frame in 
Sweden. For all other countries – Brazil, UK and US – this information is available for 100% of the sampling 
frame. Regular Government Schools refers to the percentage of regular government schools which are funded 
& managed exclusively by government authorities (this excludes private and autonomous government schools). 
This information is not available for Canadian schools.  
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TABLE C3: THE SURVEY RESPONSE RATES 
 
BR CA DE IN 
All Eligible All Eligible All Eligible All Eligible 
Interviews completed (%) 37.6 58.1 13.9 19.1 22.7 26.0 35.1 41.5 
Interviews refused (%) 8.2 12.7 4.5 6.1 14.3 16.3 7.6 9.0 
Scheduling in progress (%) 18.9 29.2 54.5 74.8 50.4 57.7 41.8 49.5 
School not eligible (%) 35.4 - 27.1 - 12.7 - 15.6 - 
Sample, numb. of firms (#) 1377 1073 631 907 
Interviews completed (#) 517 149 143 318 
         
 
IT SE UK  US  
All Eligible All Eligible All Eligible All Eligible 
Interviews completed (%) 45.2 56.6 29.8 35.6 7.3 7.9 17.2 20.1 
Interviews refused (%) 11.8 14.7 1.7 2.0 11.5 12.5 5.5 6.4 
Scheduling in progress (%) 22.9 28.7 52.2 62.4 73.6 79.6 63.0 73.5 
School not eligible (%) 20.2  16.3 - 7.6 - 14.3 - 
Sample, numb. of firms (#) 773 295 1482 1618 
Interviews completed (#) 349 88 108 279 
Notes: BR=Brazil, CA=Canada, DE=Germany, IN=India, IT=Italy, SE=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, 
US=United States. 1) Interviews completed reports all the companies contacted for which a management 
interview was completed. These numbers might differ from the number of observations used in this paper because 
we drop any interviews which have a reliability score of less than 5. We compute this measure by adding the 
scores (on a 1-5 scale) of two indicators provided by the interviewee after the interview is completed: i) the 
interviewee’s knowledge of the management practices current in place at his or her school, and ii) the 
interviewee’s willingness to reveal information about the management practices of his or her school. 2) 
Scheduling in progress reports all the companies contacted with no interview run or manager refusing to be 
interviewed. 3) Interviews refused reports all companies contacted in which the manager refused to take part in 
the interview. 4) No longer eligible reports all schools contacted which do not offer general education to 15-year 
olds or have less than 50 pupils. It also included organizations out-of business or for which no phone number was 
found. Survey sample is the total number of firms that were randomly selected and contacted from the complete 
sampling frame. 
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TABLE C4: SELECTION ANALYSIS 
Country: BR CA DE IN IT SE UK US 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: =1 if school interview occurred 
Log(pupils) 0.053 0.118** 0.024 0.114 -0.107 0.024 0.089 -0.085** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.137) (0.073) (0.167) (0.166) (0.124) (0.043) 
Regular Government 
Schools 0.151  0.047 0.593***  0.031 -0.077 0.038 
 (0.106)  (0.171) (0.099)  (0.213) (0.110) (0.094) 
Log(population density 
in the region) -0.065* -0.091 0.059 -0.253*** 0.046 -0.050 0.065 -0.076* 
 (0.038) (0.059) (0.173) (0.060) (0.124) (0.070) (0.050) (0.039) 
Panel B  
Dependent variable: =1 if school interview occurred and pupil outcomes available 
Log(pupils) 0.072 0.214***  -0.212**  0.054 0.274** 0.011 
 (0.054) (0.069)  (0.086)  (0.168) (0.124) (0.057) 
Regular Government 
Schools 0.322***   0.001  0.104 -0.082 0.713*** 
 (0.106)   (0.108)  (0.216) (0.111) (0.147) 
Log(population density 
in the region) -0.043 0.251***  -0.093*  -0.074 0.082* 0.045 
 (0.038) (0.076)  (0.054)  (0.072) (0.049) (0.050) 
Observations 847 754 379 678 348 230 1339 1298 
Notes: Probit with marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. BR=Brazil, CA=Canada, 
DE=Germany, IN=India, IT=Italy, SE=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. Regular Government 
Schools refers to the percentage of regular government schools which are funded & managed exclusively by 
government authorities (this excludes private and autonomous government schools). This information is not 
available for Canadian schools. Population density is at the state-level in Brazil, India, and the US, province-level 
in Canada, and NUTS 2 regions in Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK. 
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Canada, private ersatzschulen in Germany, friskolor in Sweden, academies, foundation, and voluntary-aided schools in the UK, and charter and magnet schools in the US. 
Population density is at the NUTS3 level. The competition variable is collected during the survey itself by asking the principal “How many other schools offering education 
to 15 year-olds are within a 30-minute drive from your school?” STEM background refers to principals with a background in Science, Technology, Engineering, Maths, and 
Business. The autonomy questions were asked and measured during the survey. For personnel autonomy, we ask “To hire a full-time teacher what agreement would you 
need?, for budgetary autonomy, we ask “What is the largest capital investment you can make without prior authorization from outside?” and for academic content autonomy, 
we ask “To add a new class - for example, introducing a new language such as Mandarin - what agreement would you need?”. To measure the degree of autonomy we use a 
1-5 scale where 1 refers to no authority to make any decision and 5 refers to complete authority to make any decision. Principal accountability variable measures the degree to 
which the principal is responsible for delivering the school targets and the principal strategy variable measures the degree to which the principal communicates a well-
established strategy for the school for the next 5 years.  
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